Problems of COMMUNISM

New Trends in Maoism?
BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ

Soviet Prospects in the Middle East
WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

Tito and Gomulka
ANDREW HAVEN

Sidney Hook on G. D. H. Cole

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"Paths to Socialism"

EDITORS' NOTE: Perhaps no development in recent years is more indicative of the profound impact of Stalin's death than the emergence of different *genres* of communism, all of them challenging Moscow's claims to ideological infallibilty and omniscience. Under Stalin, the Soviet bloc presented a picture of total ideological uniformity. The USSR was the "model" for all other countries "struggling" to achieve "socialism," and all efforts, however minor, to deviate from it were denounced and brutally extinguished. The appearance of monolithic unity and ardent loyalty to the USSR, however, began to disintegrate soon after Stalin's death. This disintegration was first manifested in the various "new courses" introduced in the "people's democracies" in 1954-1955, designed to free these countries from the disastrous effects of their slavish imitation of Soviet methods; it was accentuated by Tito's rehabilitation in June 1955 and by Khrushchev's belated recognition of "different paths to socialism" in February 1956; it finally came to a head in Hungary and Poland in the fateful month of October 1956.

While in Hungary popular dissatisfaction with Stalinism turned into a full-fledged anti-Soviet revolt, the "October Revolution" in Poland took place within the framework of "a Polish road to socialism" and was eventually—though reluctantly—accepted by the Kremlin as a *fait accompli*. Besides dealing with Tito, the Soviets now had to tolerate another genuine heretic in their midst—the erstwhile "right deviationist" Wladyslaw Gomulka. Finally, the leader of the Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung, also came out openly as an exponent of a new *genre* of communism; his recent addresses of February and March, though marked by a remarkable paucity of theoretical originality, nevertheless made it clear to the Kremlin and to the rest of the world that Communist China was no longer content to play the subsidiary role assigned to her in Stalin's lifetime.

The significance of the various new "paths to socialism" formulated by these leaders is the subject matter of the articles below. In "New Trends in Maoism?", Mr. Schwartz demonstrates that the Chinese "path" expresses itself primarily in ideological terms. Its significance for domestic Communist policies is difficult to determine at this juncture, inasmuch as Mao's pronouncements are couched in vague phrases lending themselves to sundry and conflicting interpretations; in the area of foreign relations, however, they clearly bespeak Mao's desire to assert himself as an "autonomous" force in the Communist world, capable of exerting influence on internal developments in other Communist countries. In contrast to China, Yugoslavia and Poland have had relatively little to say on ideological questions (though more in the case of Tito than Gomulka), but have made important institutional changes in their systems. The similarities and contrasts between Tito's and Gomulka's positions, as well as some of the outstanding problems they each face, form the subject of the second article. The third article highlights one important aspect of the institutional innovations of Polish communism—workers' councils. For a discussion of Yugoslav workers' councils, the reader is referred to "Is Russia Going Titoist?," by Ernst Halperin, *Problems of Communism*, No. 5, September-October 1956.

New Trends in Maoism?

By Benjamin Schwartz

OVER THE PAST YEAR or so a series of striking ideological pronouncements have emanated from Communist China, the most important of them voiced by Mao Tse-tung himself. The potential significance of these pronouncements for the Communist world—already churning under the impact of forces set in motion by the Twentieth CPSU Congress—has inevitably led to wide speculation on the precise implications of Mao's new theses. Among the questions which arise: In what respect do they contain genuine innovations in Communist thought, when viewed in the light of Soviet ideological developments? Have they been merely a response

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to current pressures in China and in the Communist camp as a whole, or do they reflect long-term latent tendencies of the Chinese Communist movement under its present leadership? What, if any, have been the practical effects of these pronouncements on the Chinese scene? While it is much too soon to formulate definitive opinions on these questions, a tentative assessment of the content and import of the new Chinese "line" is in order.

Immediate Motives

The current pressures—both foreign and domestic—which lie behind these pronouncements are not difficult to discern. The whole post-Stalin development in the Soviet orbit, climaxing in the events in Poland and Hungary, has been a compelling factor in determining Peiping's outlook. Mao's speech of February 27, 1957, even in its edited form, reveals in particular a deep concern over the Hungarian uprising and its implications. On the domestic side, the regime's effort to apply a Stalinist model of economic development has clearly gotten the Communists into troubled waters. It requires no insight to see a direct connection between the growing sense of crisis in many areas of the Communists' program and their attempt to spur the initiative of the non-party professional intelligentsia—one of the explicitly-stated aims of the new slogan, "Let the hundred flowers blossom; let the hundred schools of thought contend," when it was first proclaimed last year.

On the other hand, the views expressed in some quarters that the recent ideological shifts are wholly a response to the acute economic crisis in China, or that a state of revolt of Hungarian proportions was imminent, should—in this author's opinion—be treated with skepticism. The present economic situation of the Chinese masses cannot be much worse than that of the Soviet people in the comparable period of Stalin's early Five-Year Plans. In spite of the infinite suffering and deprivation forced on the population, the Soviet regime had developed instruments of control strong enough to prevent any serious popular threat to its power. That Peiping's control instruments are just as effective seems evident from the speed with which it has implemented the forcible collectivization program herding vast masses of peasants into producers cooperatives. It may be urged that events in other parts of the Communist world have created in many strata of the Chinese population a far less compliant attitude toward the sufferings attendant upon a Stalinist model of industrial development. If this is so, it is a fact which reflects recent changes in climate in the Communist world as a whole and is not simply a result of the Chinese economic crisis *per se*. Possibly, however, the CPC leadership itself—particularly Mao—has become more and more uneasy about meeting economic difficulties in 1957 in precisely the same manner in which Stalin met them in the early 1930's, though the machinery for doing so is at hand.

On the whole, this author would be inclined to surmise that to whatever extent the new ideological shifts are a response to current pressures, the whole international situation—and particularly the situation in the Communist world—looms larger than purely domestic pressures.

Furthermore, while these shifts may represent a response to current pressures, some of them may also represent the culmination of trends long latent in the Maoist version of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The current situation may, in some respects, merely have provided a more propitious climate for a bolder and more explicit statement of conclusions already implicit in previously held notions. These factors of motivation must be weighed in terms of the content of Peiping's pronouncements.

"Let the Flowers Blossom . . ."

The major concepts of Mao's new line are collectively expressed by the now-famous slogan quoted above: "Let the hundred flowers bloom; let the hundred schools of thought contend." These were the catch-words of Mao's important speeches of February 27 and March 12; the slogan had made its first appearance, however, over a year ago. One of the first and most authoritative statements on the theme was a speech of May 26, 1956, by Lu Ting-yi, Director of Propaganda for the CPC Central Committee, which set forth many of the basic ideas now confirmed and elaborated upon by Mao: hence Lu's speech must be considered an organic part of the whole ideological shift which has since transpired.

As Lu points out, the phrase "hundred schools" is an allusion to the hundred schools of philosophy which flourished during the Chou dynasty before Confucianism was made an official philosophy. It was, indeed, a period of great genuine freedom of thought. Lu makes clear, however, that while the philosophic conflicts of the Chou period represented deep contradictions among contending social classes, in present-day China such differences among "the hundred schools" will take place "under the conscious direction of the people." Thus a distinction is drawn between non-antagonistic contradictions "within the people" and antagonistic contradictions of a society where genuine irreconcilable class struggle exists.

Lu treats "the people" as an organic unity, but, he points out, there are still four social classes—proletariat, peasantry, petit-bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie; thus there are also "elements of disunity" in the people.

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Each of these classes continues to evince its own characteristic ideology in spite of the great progress which has been made in the ideological transformation of all classes in China. Since they are part of the people, however, these classes are educable. Their ideological sickness (a favorite metaphor of Mao's) can be treated by therapy. The therapy should, however, not include terror or "crude coercive methods." "Idealistic" attitudes are clearly unhealthy, say Lu and Mao; yet they cannot and must not be eliminated through sheer force of suppression. In fact, there is some good in letting these views flourish, for they can prevent Marxism-Leninism from becoming a "hot-house plant." In some sense, by a dialectic process (Mao's mind is obsessed by the imagery of the dialectic as he understands it), these flowers, noxious and otherwise, may even help to enrich Marxism-Leninism.

The new doctrine makes it clear that it is not simply a question of the content of the ideas but of who advocates them. When an "idealistic" notion is advocated by a "member of the people" it is legitimate. The same idea advocated by an "enemy" or an "unmistakable counterrevolutionary" is inadmissible. The power of determining who is a member of the people and who is a counterrevolutionary remains firmly in the hands of the Communist government. What is more, there is no guarantee that a particular idea may not prove, in the government's view, so noxious and so "revisionist" that it may remove its advocate from the category of "the people" to the category of "the enemy."

While one of the aims is to bring to the surface some of the false ideas which are normally present in "the people," perhaps even more interesting is the implication that in the area of arts and sciences there should be something like a genuine free market of ideas. The novelty here is that Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by the party may not at any given point in time even have a clear-cut view on what is right or wrong in this area. Lu Ting-yi is quite explicit on this subject. "The natural sciences," he states, "have no class nature." This is novel indeed, for while Stalin himself proclaimed that there are spheres of culture—language in particular—which belong neither to the substructure nor to the superstructure, he was careful not to include the natural sciences in this category. The same rejection of Marxist infallibility also applies to literature. According to Lu, literature must "serve the workers, peasants and soldiers," but "socialist realism" may not be the only creative methodology which serves this purpose.

Mao's statement of February 27 also stresses the significance of the slogan for the realm of art and science. "Different forms and styles in art can develop freely and different schools in science can contend freely. . . . Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles." While all this seems to recognize a certain autonomy for science and a somewhat lesser autonomy for art, the nebulous phraseology leaves no doubt that the decision whether any given form of art "serves the people" clearly belongs to the political leaders. Since party personnel occupy strategic places in artistic circles, one may well have one's doubts about the freedom of discussion even within these circles. There is nothing to prevent the leaders from deciding that a given aspect of the arts or sciences is actually very relevant to vital areas of Marxism-Leninism. *No institutionalized guarantees of freedom are granted.*

Nevertheless, while Mao has not really relinquished the state's totalitarian powers within these areas, there may be a genuine desire to hold them in reserve—always present, if not continuously active. Whether the withdrawal of totalitarian controls will actually mean a relinquishment of ultimate spiritual authority in the natural sciences, remains to be seen.

The new slogans bear an interesting relationship to Soviet ideology. In the USSR there is one area in which "idealism" is tolerated—that of religion. At no time, however, has Soviet doctrine claimed that other forms of "bourgeois idealism" should be allowed to flourish as "normal" expressions of Soviet life. Soviet "socialist" society is presumably a classless society and as such the Soviet people can have only one legitimate ideology—that of Marxism-Leninism. The erroneous ideas that do continue to persist, according to the doctrine, are either capitalist remnants in the minds of the people or the result of sinister influences from the enemy abroad. The only correct way of dealing with these "survivals" is to extirpate them mercilessly. Gentler methods can be applied only to religion, as a peculiarly stubborn remnant. At no time have Soviet theoreticians asserted that Marxism-Leninism requires the constant stimulus of hostile ideas in order to retain its creativity. The Communist Party presumably possesses sufficient inner resources to provide whatever self-correction or self-criticism is necessary. In this respect, then, Mao's doctrine signifies a further departure from Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy.

Major Assumptions

As stated earlier, the slogan of "let the hundred flowers blossom, let the hundred schools of thought contend" actually appeared some time before Mao's pronouncements of February 27 and March 12. As such, it rests upon a series of general theoretical tenets which have even earlier roots, and which must be grasped before a full assessment of the significance of the current slogans is attempted.

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The first assumption underlying Chinese Communist doctrine is that "socialism" in China is built by the "people" as a whole, representing four social classes—the proletariat, the peasantry, the petit-bourgeoisie, and the "national" bourgeoisie. While the people is led by the Communist Party, and while the party is described as the "vanguard" of the industrial proletariat, the doctrine also maintains that the interests of the other classes, on the other hand, are not represented by the party, but by the other "democratic parties" and organs such as the Chinese People's Consultative Conference. Mao Tse-tung himself is, of course, not only the head of the Communist Party, but also of the "people's government" as a whole. One might say that the whole tendency of his recent thought is to magnify the importance of the latter's role at the expense of the former.

A glance at Soviet doctrine in this respect affords some interesting comparisons. According to its spokesmen, the Soviet social system is a classless society. The Communist Party represents the interest of two ("non-antagonistic"!) classes—the proletariat and the working peasantry—as well as of the "working intelligentsia," which is defined as a "stratum." This is at variance with Chinese doctrine, which assigns a large segment of the non-party intelligentsia to the bourgeoisie. What this means is that the Soviet intelligentsia is presumably wholly committed to Marxism-Leninism, while the Chinese intelligentsia is, by definition, capable of committing numerous ideological errors, all considered "normal" expressions of the existing situation. This line of reasoning has been carried even further: thus, a Chinese publication stated recently that even after all classes disappear in China, the apparatus of the united front government will still be necessary, since separate economic and social interests will remain, and will require their own representation.

The idea that the whole "people" can build socialism rests on the assumption that all classes of Chinese society are subject to spiritual transformation by education and "persuasion." Their ideological sickness can be cured by proper therapy. The speech of February 27 carries this whole notion to its logical conclusion. "All classes, strata, and social groups that approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people." The concept of "the people," then, must ultimately be defined in terms of its conscious attitudes. This means that even though the "people" and "the enemy" are separate organisms, the membrane between them is highly porous. Presumably Chiang Kai-shek and the Taiwan government could pass over from the class of the enemy to the people were he to develop proper attitudes toward "socialist transformation;" "revisionists," on the other hand, may pass from the ranks of the people to those of the enemy.

Part of the therapy, however, lies in the recognition that so long as the people includes classes like the petit-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie they will continue to evince idealist ideology. The best way to cure the ailment is to allow the unhealthy ideas to express themselves while subjecting them to a constant treatment of ideological transformation.

These formulations led Mao to a further assumption—namely, that non-antagonistic contradictions are a normal phenomenon among the people, even in a socialist society.

Non-Antagonistic Contradictions

Now the concept of antagonistic versus non-antagonistic contradictions is actually of Soviet origin. In the Soviet Union, it was first used in the realm of literature in order to imbue it with a sense of conflict; in addition, Soviet theoreticians have maintained that there are non-antagonistic contradictions between the forces of production and relations of production. What is novel in the Chinese case is not the concept but the use to which it has been put.

The Chinese contribution to the concept of "non-antagonistic" contradictions consists of two parts. First, the Chinese claim that contradictions between the national bourgeoisie (which is an exploiting class) and the proletariat are non-antagonistic. This formulation is not to be found in Soviet doctrinal writings. Second—and in this case more importantly—Maoism now asserts that contradictions between the "leaders" and the people in a socialist society are similarly non-antagonistic.

Now the latter notion is not original either in China or in the Soviet Union. In fact it dates back to Lenin's dichotomy between the "masses" and the "vanguard," with its stress on the omniscience of the latter (armed with the Marxist doctrine and surveying the historic scene from a height that provides it with a larger perspective) and the limitations of the former (bent on the satisfaction of their immediate needs, and incapable of comprehending their "objective" interests). In the USSR, a great deal has been said about conflicts between the masses and the "bureaucrats" (though the term "non-antagonistic contradictions" has never been applied in this connection). The important innovation here is, however, in the use of the word "leaders" rather than "bureaucrats." Presumably not only lower bureaucrats but the whole Communist Party and even Mao himself may be involved in contradictions with the masses. Indeed, Mao seems to imply that in many cases the party may be wrong, inasmuch as it may have become too remote from the immediate interests of the people.

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Since the party as a whole may occasionally lapse from its infallibility, it follows that it should be exposed to criticism from other parties and groups. While it is true that generally speaking the Communist Party is the custodian of Marxist-Leninist truth, whereas the other democratic groups are still infected with a bourgeois mentality, on given concrete matters their criticism may well be justified.

With regard to the position of Mao himself, the general possibility of his being wrong does arise. However, Mao is again not only the leader of the Communist Party but also the leader of the people. By identifying himself occasionally with the "people" rather than with the party, he can himself, as it were, criticize the party from without.

A Bow to Moscow

Now while all these assumptions may be said to represent further shifts away from previous orthodoxy, the fact remains that on one point of doctrine, the year 1956 actually saw what seems to be a deference to Soviet orthodoxy.

During the whole period from Yenan until 1956, the Chinese Communists had stubbornly refused to state that China would require a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in its period of "transition to socialism." In the CPC statement on the "Historic Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," however, we find it explicitly stated that the Chinese people's democratic dictatorship is a form of dictatorship of the proletariat. Behind this lies a complex history of ideological relationships with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders—including Khrushchev—have insisted on the retention of the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" as constituting the indispensable heart of Leninism. In effect, what they indicated to the Chinese at the time of the Twentieth Congress was that the Chinese were entirely free to construe this phrase in any way they saw fit, provided that they kept it. Here we have one of those cases in which a term itself is important even if emptied of all substance. By April of 1956 the Chinese proved willing to accept this compromise. The events in Hungary may in fact have reinforced their view that this had been a wise decision. They too, like the Soviets, are interested in preserving an inviolable core of shared doctrine or at least shared phraseology. Yet the adoption of this phrase has had little effect on the course of ideological development. It is in fact quite interesting to note that the

A NEW CHINESE PUZZLE

How to Judge What is Right and What is Wrong

In the political life of our country, how are our people to determine what is right and what is wrong in our words and actions? Basing ourselves on the principles of our Constitution, the will of the overwhelming majority of our people and the political programs jointly proclaimed on various occasions by our political parties and groups, we believe that, broadly speaking, words and actions can be judged right if they:

1. Help to unite the people of our various nationalities, and do not divide them;
2. Are beneficial, not harmful, to Socialist transformation and Socialist construction;
3. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship;
4. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism;
5. Tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party;
6. Are beneficial, not harmful,to international Socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Of these six criteria, the most important are the Socialist path and the leadership of the party. These criteria are put forward in order to foster, and not hinder, the free discussion of various questions among the people.

—*Mao Tse-tung, "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," as issued in English by the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, and published in* The New York Times, *June 19, 1957.*

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published version of Mao's February speech does not include one reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Practical Implications

What, if any, have been the practical effects of these shifts within China?

In a speech delivered before the People's Consultative Conference, Lo Lung-chi complains that "during the last year not many flowers blossomed and few schools of thought contended in the academic and ideological fields . . . the basic cause here is that the higher intellectuals are still suspicious and are still plagued by misgivings." And well they might be. They have no assurance that they may not be reclassified at any moment from the status of member of the people to the status of enemy. They can never be sure whether any idea propounded by them will be regarded by the authorities as an expression of "normal" bourgeois idealism of the people or a "dangerous revisionism." Furthermore, there is the presumption that the intellectuals are making steady progress in their march away from "idealism" to a proper grasp of Marxism-Leninism. All this does not provide a very fertile soil for large varieties of floral vegetation.

In practice, then, the present phraseology merely implies a shift in emphasis. Physical coercion will—by and large—not be used in ideological matters. When errors are found in assertions which are purportedly orthodox, they will be treated less severly. There will be a certain relaxation in the application of party doctrine in the field of the natural sciences. In literature one may try new approaches—though at some risk. Within the official ideology more play will be allowed on certain pre-designated academic questions. For instance, Chinese intellectuals will probably be allowed to learn something about "bourgeois thought" (*e.g.* of Keynesian economics). It is possible that Mao has more in mind than this. If so, this has not yet become manifest in current Chinese literature.

Similarly, no sweeping consequences seem to be in order in the whole area of contradictions within the people and contradictions between the people and the leaders. To be sure, more status has been accorded to the so-called democratic parties and the People's Political Consultative Conference. They have been given considerable publicity and been the object of particular attention. Conversely, the very notion that there should be "mutual supervision" between the democratic parties and the Communist Party will inevitably lower the party from its hitherto dazzling heights. Essentially, however, the notion of contradiction between "leaders" and "people" reduces itself to a conventional attack on bureaucratism couched in the language of thought remolding.

Of course, these ideological shifts may yet have spectacular consequences in China's domestic development (perhaps even consequences unforeseen by the leadership). However, if Mao and his entourage wish to restrict their practical significance to as narrow an area as possible, the slippery language of these pronouncements makes it possible to do so.

Peiping vs. Moscow?

In terms of relations with Moscow and other parts of the Communist world, as well as in terms of relations to uncommitted Asia, however, these shifts may have an enormous significance. More clearly than ever Mao proclaims his position as a theorist in his own right and, by the same token, emphasizes the unassailable ideological autonomy of Communist China. He further implies that not only has the "Chinese path to socialism" differed from Moscow's but that "socialism" itself may differ in China. In China socialism will be compatible with a multi-party government and will recognize real differences of interest among the various strata of the people. It is perhaps these implications which have particularly excited the Polish Communists deeply immersed in their own manifold "contradictions."

It is toward Asia, too, that Mao's statements are directed. The vision of a whole people "building" socialism without engendering any bitter and inexorable conflicts is designed to elicit the sympathy of nations for whom the very term "socialism" is immensely attractive. To Asian intellectuals, consumed by a fervent nationalism, bitterly resentful of the West, the "Chinese path" may well seem to be preferable to that of the USSR. The attack on "crude coercive methods" and the slogan of the "hundred schools"—whatever its ambiguous meaning in China—implies that a Communist regime may embrace the methods of a political democracy without abandoning its fundamental totalitarian controls. The fact that the verbal euphoria is not accompanied by institutional safeguards may possibly be lost on those elements of the Asian populations that are wont to take Communist promises for granted, without inquiring into their real nature.

Mao's emphasis on the "Chinese path" does not mean, of course, that he does not desire solidarity with the Communist world, or that he is not fundamentally hostile to the West. At the same time, however, it means that the solidarity must be achieved on Mao's own terms, and on the basis of his autonomy within the Communist bloc. If there is to be a common core of doctrine which all Communist states must share, Mao must have as much discretion in defining this core as anyone in the Kremlin.

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The notion that Mao wishes to assume the leadership of the whole Communist world is probably not justified; but there is little doubt that he intends to play an increasingly important part in it.

The Historical Perspective

Do any of the ideological shifts examined here have prior antecedents, or are they all responses to immediate pressures? Actually, as stated before, there is a considerable history behind some of the notions which manifest themselves in Mao's statements. A drift toward the notion that "socialism" in China would be built by the whole "people"—in other words, toward a sort of "populist" concept at variance with a strictly class interpretation of the march of history—began at a very early date. At the same time, it is true, the "people" was still defined as an assemblage of "classes," each with its own class interests and ideology. It is this curious amalgamation of the notion of a sort of popular "general will" and the notion of class interests "within the people" which laid the basis for Mao's recent pronouncement on non-antagonistic contradictions within socialist society.

The "united front" line of the Yenan period was, in itself, not a manifestation of such a drift. The notion of a united front during the "bourgeois democratic" stage of social revolution is, of course, nothing new in Communist ideology. However, even in the Yenan days and in the immediate postwar period, Mao occasionally hinted that in China the whole "people," including the national bourgeoisie, would be "educated" to an acceptance of socialism. Mao's speech on the "People's Democratic Dictatorhip" in 1949 hinted it still more strongly, and so did the Chinese Communist constitution of 1954.

Viewing the Chinese tendency in the broader perspective of the historical development of Communist ideology, one may say that suggestions of a clash between a strictly Marxist class interpretation and a sort of "populist" interpretation were already discernible in Lenin himself. On the other hand, Mao has not by any means abandoned all the cliches of class analysis. What we note here is a general drift which has become considerably accelerated within the Chinese context.

Closely allied to the Chinese tendency toward a "populist" interpretation of the path to socialism is the tremendous insistence placed by Maoism on the potentialities of "ideological remolding" and "thought reform." The whole "people" can build "socialism" precisely because the whole people can be spiritually transformed by proper educational (and therapeutic) methods. The whole emphasis on "ideological remolding" and "thought reform" through "persuasion," which ultimately led to all the refinements of "brainwashing," had its origins in the Yenan days. At first, to be sure, the methods were applied in a much narrower sphere: it was more a question of turning the intellectuals, semi-intellectuals and peasants who made up the Chinese Communist Party into "spiritual" proletarians. After 1949, however, the same methods which had been used in "molding" good Communists out of presumably recalcitrant material were applied to the "people" as a whole. Long before February 27, the doctrine was proclaimed that *ultimately* whole classes, such as the peasantry, petit bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, could be re-educated and cured. They could only be cured, however, if their deep-rooted ideological ailments were brought to the surface. To some extent, the whole "let the hundred schools contend" drive fits into the framework of this therapeutic process, although it is also presumed to have more positive aspects.

Here again, one cannot view the Chinese experience in isolation from previous Soviet developments. With Lenin himself consciousness came to play a role never contemplated by Marx. Nevertheless, the notion of the transformation of whole social classes (including the "bourgeoisie") by educative methods marked another step forward in the disintegration of Communist doctrine. It was this assumption, above all, which underlaid Mao's recent pronouncements.

Mao's "Socialism"

What, then, is the overall vision presented in Mao's speeches? It is the vision of a totalitarian society by consent, so to speak, a society in which the state may hold its authority in reserve in certain well-defined areas of culture (such as natural science). The "fundamental" harmony of the society will be preserved all the more effectively by allowing an area of slack—that is, by recognizing that certain clashes of interest and a certain degree of ideological error are normal, and that there may be certain areas of the arts and science where Marxism-Leninism does not immediately yield any answers.

The authority of the state, however, remains supreme, and the basic concept is still fundamentally totalitarian. The leaders still embody the fundamental interests of the people apart from any institutions of political democracy. No institutional check on the power of the leaders is contemplated in any area. The leaders determine who belongs to the category of the "people" and who has gone over to the "enemy." The leaders determine what types of flowers shall blossom and what types of vegetation are so poisonously revisionist that they must be uprooted. In the contradiction between

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"leaders" and "people," it is clear where the ultimate discretion lies, although it is not impossible that at times Mao may align himself with the "people" against the "party."

The areas in which "contradictions" are possible remain hazy. The definition of "normal" error also remains vague. In fact, all formulae are so ambiguous that the government can use them alternatively to encourage real and wide-ranging freedom in the marketplace of ideas or to retreat to the situation as it existed before 1956. It may also use them to create—as it seems to be doing at present—certain contrived, intentional deviations.

Quite apart from the ultimate domestic effect of these formulae, however, they remain significant for what they are intended to suggest to the countries of the Communist world and the countries of non-committed Asia. Above all they confirm more decisively than ever the ideological autonomy of Communist China.

Tito and Gomulka:

Some Contrasts and Comparisons

By Andrew Haven

THE DRAMATIC SUCCESSES of Wladyslaw Gomulka as the spearhead of Poland's "peaceful revolution" against Moscow and as leader and launcher of an independent Polish "road to socialism" have led some observers to equate his role in the Communist orbit with that of Tito—and therefore Poland's role with that of Yugoslavia. In particular, there has been a growing tendency since last October to treat Gomulka as synonymous with Poland and Polish policy, in the same way that Tito, to the world at large, has come to personify Yugoslavia. There are some valid bases for these parallels, but there is also a danger of serious over-simplification. For while both leaders have emerged as courageous and shrewd challengers of the Soviet Goliath, vastly different circumstances have governed their actions and currently affect their status at home and in the world. An examination of their relative roles affords a useful framework for some observations on the important shifts of power and policy now going on in Eastern Europe.

Tito, to begin with, has long been firmly entrenched as master in his own house; his final authority in shaping Yugoslav policy has never been seriously questioned, and he has become the object of an indigenous personality cult which is unparalleled today in the satellite countries. From the outset of Tito's quarrel with Moscow he was able to maintain his position as undisputed boss of his party and people, a support accorded to him in part because of his wartime role as a resistance leader. The Communist bureaucracy in Yugoslavia was —and remained— his personal instrument of power, and it has had a vested interest in the maintenance of his regime.

The rift in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was more a matter of personal antagonism between Stalin and Tito than of nation-wide antagonism toward the USSR, as is the case in Poland. Moscow was far away, and there were no Soviet troops on Yugoslav soil. There was no deeply ingrained tradition of anti-Russianism in Yugoslavia—certainly, at least, among the Serbian majority for whom pan-Slavism historically has had a certain appeal—whereas the Polish people for centuries have looked upon Russians with fear and hatred as the heriditary foe. In short, Tito was able to make his challenge to Moscow from a position of absolute authority, knowing that national sentiment was behind him but not having to fear that it would get out of hand; his feud with Stalin built up gradually, and even at the time of their final break there was still sufficient room for maneuver to have allowed a compromise solution had either leader sought it.

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By contrast, Gomulka's challenge to Moscow has been made under conditions of precarious instability. Gomulka found himself on the way to power at a time when anti-Soviet feeling had reached a boiling point, when the entire Polish nation was seething with discontent, and when one wrong step might well have led to a blood-bath. The intervention of locally-stationed Soviet troops in the Polish "revolution" was avoided only because Gomulka was able to prevent the pressures of popular feeling from pushing him farther than he knew Moscow would let him go. This became increasingly difficult after the profound impact of the Hungarian uprising on the Polish people, and it is a measure of Gomulka's political skill and iron nerve that he succeeded. Today he is still faced with an extremely fluid and potentially explosive situation: he has the arduous task of establishing a course which will preserve the fundamentals of the Communist system while managing to meet popular demands for greater freedom and an amelioration of living conditions. At the same time he must satisfy Moscow's strategic demands arising out of Poland's geographic location. And he must accomplish all this in the face of continuing opposition from the die-hard Stalinist faction in the party, and therefore without full control over the party bureaucracy.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT factor affecting Gomulka's position *vis-à-vis* that of Tito is the entrenched power of the Catholic Church in Poland. For centuries the Church has been a dominant influence in the religious and secular lives of the Polish people. It has always been identified with national resistance to foreign encroachments, and by its very creed it has become an important source of resistance to the Communist ideology. In order to establish himself as a national rather than as simply a Communist leader, Gomulka has had to deal with the episcopate on more or less equal terms to accept the fact that the Poles remain a Catholic people. By his own admission he has been forced into a compromise which cuts right across the accepted tenets of Marxism. In a speech of last May 15 to the Ninth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, he announced:

We have made an agreement with the Catholic Church, and we even agreed to voluntary religious instruction in the schools. . . . It goes without saying that this situation is not in accordance with out party's ideology. However, the party cannot close its eyes to reality.

Asserting that the Church and the State would have to co-exist for a long time to come, he went on to plead that ideological competition between the party and the Church never grow into political strife:

In matters which concern the vital interest of People's Poland we would like to see the Church follow the Polish road together with us.[1]

Tito has faced no comparable problem. In Yugoslavia the Serb majority adheres to the Orthodox Church, which has had little of the pro-Western orientation of Catholicism and which has accommodated itself to the Communist regime, as have Orthodox Churches throughout Eastern Europe. The Catholic Church has some strength, but only in Croatia has it posed a potential source of resistance to the regime. Tito has been able to contain this threat, relying in part on the religious and ethnic feelings of the majority of other South Slavs.

Gomulka's approach to solving the problems posed by the position of the Catholic Church certainly warrants identification as one aspect of a unique and specifically Polish "road to socialism." Whether coexistence between church and party is compatible with Communist concepts of progress along that road remains to be seen.

The Map: Poland's Permanent Predicament

Perhaps above all, the factor of geography—with the complex political and strategic considerations that it raises—has profoundly influenced the relative positions and policies of Gomulka and Tito.

Moscow, in short, might put up with a Tito in Yugoslavia but it could never tolerate an anti-Soviet Poland on its Western frontier. Throughout the "peaceful revolution" in Poland Gomulka and his supporters went to great pains to curb public expressions of anti-Soviet sentiment, not only because of their own interest in preventing reforms from going "too far" but also to dissuade Moscow from deciding that Soviet military intervention was necessary to its own security. To remain in power, the Gomulka regime must keep Moscow so convinced.

Poland, moreover, is dependent on the USSR as the defender of its own Western frontier. Having lost their Eastern provinces to the USSR in 1945, the Poles are united in jealously guarding the so-called regained territories in the West. And as the party organ *Trybuna Ludu* has stated in words clearly intelligible to all Poles, Communist and non-Communists alike: "The frontiers of the Polish Republic are recognized by all our Communist neighbors as inviolable and are guaranteed by the USSR—the only great power to do so."[2] At a Moscow reception last April Khrushchev told Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz: "The Oder-Neisse frontier is a frontier of peace; it is both your frontier and ours. If

[1] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, May 16, 1957.

[2] April 20, 1957.

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anyone should cross your frontier, this would be a threat not only to you, but also to the security of the USSR." [3]

Irrespective of the official policy of the Bonn Government and the parrot-like protestations of Moscow's puppets in East Berlin, the Polish people are well aware that few Germans are prepared to regard the Oder-Neisse frontier as the permanent demarcation line between the two nations. Thus Poland's continuing adherence to the Warsaw Pact is more than just a formalization of her relations with the USSR. Sandwiched between their traditional enemies—the Germans and the Russians—the Poles, like the Czechs, will never be able to pursue a truly independent foreign policy. In maintaining the Polish-Soviet alliance Gomulka has chosen what most Poles regard as the lesser of two evils.

YUGOSLAVIA, by contrast, is situated on the periphery of the satellite bloc (barring tiny Albania). On ideological and psychological grounds Tito's defiance of Moscow and continued outspoken independence may have constituted a serious—and in retrospect even crucial—threat to Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe; but strategically, Moscow apparently did not consider Yugoslavia so vital a link in its empire as to warrant forcible intervention, considering the risks inherent in such a move. Thus Tito has survived for nine years, through varying degrees of Soviet hostility; in all likelihood he will keep on doing so, provided he continues to receive foreign aid.

After Stalin's death the collective leadership in Moscow made some efforts to improve party and state relations with Yugoslavia. A period of relative calm was initiated by Bulganin's and Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade and Tito's return journey to the USSR, and further enhanced by the CPSU's recognition in the Belgrade Declaration and at the Twentieth Party Congress of the principle of "separate roads to socialism." With the outbreak and brutal suppression of the Hungarian uprising, however, new acrimonious exchanges took place; Moscow, as we shall see, took offense at Tito's assessment of its actions and launched a series of attacks against Yugoslavia and its leadership.[4] Throughout this period of ups-and-downs, Tito has shown no inclination to compromise his own position seriously. Neither he nor his colleagues have missed a single opportunity to tell their Soviet comrades where they had gone wrong and what they should have done. Lately he has gone on record to say that a further deterioration in Yugoslav-Soviet relations would be "senseless" [5]; but it is safe to assume that he will remain staunch in maintaining his own independent position.

Unlike Poland, then, Yugoslavia has not been in serious fear of military intervention from the USSR. At the same time Germany does not loom as a permanent potential threat, and despite the Hitlerite occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II there is no long-standing enmity between the Germans and the Yugoslavs. As far as Tito is concerned he is almost in the enviable position dreamed up by the Polish student weekly *Po prostu,* when it plaintively speculated on what the Poles would do if they lived in Iceland.[6] This position has encouraged Tito to bold action in the game of international power politics. In a vigorous effort to establish himself as a leader in a loose alignment of neutralist countries, he has assumed an air of almost self-righteous Olympic detachment from what he calls the antagonism between the socialist camp and the Atlantic alliance, describing the Warsaw Pact and Nato nations as mutually exclusive military blocs which constitute the real threat to world peace. (*Pravda,* it might be said, has pointed out the discrepancy between this view and Yugoslavia's membership in the Balkan Pact.[7])

Conflicts and Contradictions

Very different factors, then, have played a part in determining Gomulka's and Tito's policies and tactics; the result has been a complex and often paradoxical evolvement of relations between Warsaw and Moscow, Belgrade and Moscow, and between these capitals and other countries of the Communist bloc.

Since the initial stages of the Polish "revolution," cordiality apparently has been reestablished in official relations between Warsaw and Moscow, on both the state and party levels. Some ideological differences have been aired, but these have been confined to exchanges in the press. Gomulka seems to have convinced the Soviet leadership that he is the better judge of the situation in his country, and the Kremlin apparently has decided to accept his relatively independent status, at least for the time being. At the recent Ninth Plenum of the PZPR's Central Committee, Gomulka summed up his basic stand: on the one hand, he underscored his party's belief in the importance of the Soviet-Polish alliance and his own determination to keep Poland inside the camp of socialism; on the other hand, he reiterated his rejection of the idea that the Polish "road to socialism" must follow the Soviet pattern. "The road

[3] *Pravda,* Moscow, April 21, 1957.

[4] These extended to almost all aspects of the Yugoslav system, including criticisms of the Yugoslav economy and its management; see, *e.g., Kommunist,* Moscow, No. 3 of 1957.

[5] *Politika,* Belgrade, May 25, 1957.

[6] *Po prostu,* Warsaw, December 9, 1956.

[7] Issue of March 11, 1957.

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to socialism taken by the USSR," he stated, ". . . is neither fully necessary nor entirely suitable for other nations," and he added that this view would be valid even if the USSR had avoided "the disease of the personality cult." [8]

Reduced to bare essentials, the latter view more or less expresses what Tito has been saying for nine years. The difference, from Moscow's point of view, is that Gomulka has shown no signs of wanting to export his brand of socialism; he merely claims that he is applying the principles expounded at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in attempting to lead his country toward socialism through policies adapted to specific conditions in Poland. Tito, in Moscow's view, is trying to promote his own views of the proper approach to socialism in other countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership profoundly resents what it regards as Tito's pretensions in putting himself forward as a rival Marxist oracle in Belgrade.

In particular, Moscow was infuriated by Tito's actions and statements in the course of the Hungarian uprising, however equivocal they may have seemed to the rest of the world. Premier Bulganin declared in a speech last March (on the occasion of Hungarian Premier Kadar's visit to Moscow):

All know that Imre Nagy and his group received practical support from the Yugoslav leaders. This sustained and inspired Nagy, and it is not by accident that when the counter-revolution in Hungary was smashed he found asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy.[9]

It seems fairly obvious that the macabre posthumous rehabilitation of Rajk in Hungary, carried out at Tito's insistence, emboldened the anti-Stalinist faction and contributed to Hungarian unrest. But there is no evidence that Tito gave "practical support" to the Nagy government. Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes in the East European situation that while Yugoslavia's independence may have aggravated anti-Soviet resentment in Hungary, a truly independent and democratically elected Hungarian government—had the revolution succeeded—

[8] *Trybuna Ludu*, May 16, 1957.

[9] *Pravda*, March 28, 1957.

DIALECTICALLY SPEAKING

1952

Comrade Jopik: (at a party meeting) It has been charged here that Comrade Lipniak's mother-in-law is a class enemy and religious fanatic, that she keeps running to church every day and that she goes to communion every Sunday. And what reply has Comrade Lipniak offered? He has replied that his mother-in-law is already 62 years old and that you can't change her. This, Comrades, is opportunism! This is yielding to petit-bourgeois pressure!

It's never too late to educate a person, to transform a spiritual cripple into a valuable citizen. I don't wish to engage in empty talk. My wife has a grandma who boasts not 62 years, like Comrade Lipniak's mother-in-law, but exactly 90 years, comrades! She, too, has until recently been unenlightened, but I did not succumb to opportunism and began an uncompromising struggle. The struggle wasn't easy. The prejudices were deeply ingrained in my grandma, but what chance did they have against the fervent convictions of a Marxist? I began to reeducate my grandma—delicately but firmly. First I hid her prayer book, and in its place I offered her the *Agitator's Notebook*. Grandma—still, to be sure unenlightened—began to pray from the *Notebook*. When she confused Comrade Stalin with the Lord for good, I handed her, as a prize, the *Communist Manifesto*, and examined her on it every single Sunday. And thus, Comrades, we gradually reviewed all basic postulates of Marxism. Now my wife's grandma subscribes to the *Trade Union Review* and *Krokodil*, and thanks God every evening that she has finally become enlightened.

It's never too late, Comrade Lipniak! . . .

1957

Comrade Jopik: (at home) What a scandal, what disgrace! My only son! He'd better not show his face here. . . . My name will be mud now! . . .

This scoundrel will discredit me! How will I dare to show myself to the [party] secretary? His Paul has an A in religion, and this ignoramus got an F. The son of Comrade Jopik! Wait till I get my hands on him! . . .

—From Szpilki (Warsaw), March 17, 1957

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would have proved an embarrassment to Tito's dictatorship, a consideration undoubtedly accounting for his equivocal attitude toward the uprising. As far as the Yugoslav regime is concerned, the real source of Soviet anger was Tito's famous speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, in which he distinguished between the first and second Soviet armed attacks on Budapest (of October 24 and November 4), condemning the first as unnecessary and implying that it made the second inevitable by provoking a counter-revolution.[10] This analysis is, of course, highly irritating to the Soviet leaders.

It is another paradox that Gomulka's most recently expressed view on Hungary is more lenient toward Moscow than Tito's, although at the time of the revolution probably no country felt the Hungarian tragedy as acutely as did Poland. Again at the Ninth Plenum of the CC, Gomulka stated:

We may differ from other parties in our assessment of events in Hungary, but that does not change the common view that, for the sake of the maintenance of peace and the security of all socialist countries, the Soviet army's help in suppressing counterrevolution was a regrettable but inevitable necessity.[11]

This is indeed a far cry from Polish reaction last autumn. Pro-Gomulka elements in the population knew that their own "democratization" program had sparked the initial demonstrations in Budapest; and the methods used by the Soviets to suppress the Hungarians' fight for freedom must have incensed them deeply, in view of the historic revolutionary ties between the two countries and of Poland's own precarious position *vis-à-vis* Moscow at that time. A proclamation issued by the Central Committee of the PZPR on November 2, 1956, warned against reactionary trends in Hungary but at the same time indirectly protested the Soviet action by asserting that the Hungarian people could preserve their "socialist" achievements "through their own efforts and not by intervention from abroad."[12] Gomulka's difficulties in controlling public opinion even among his supporters was illustrated by the persistence of anti-Soviet comment in the Polish press and radio after his return from Moscow, where he had agreed to support the Kadar government. On November 23, 1956, *Zycie Warszawy* dismissed the Soviet allegation that the Hungarian revolt had been instigated by agents from abroad as "wholly primitive and over-simplified." On the next day Warsaw Radio broadcast a dispatch from its Budapest correspondent, Marian Bielicki, which declared:

Hungary was a great national revolution. . . . The Hungarian population in its entirety took up arms in its just struggle. Its hands, and its hands alone, raised the banner of the Hungarian revolution on the barricades.

The fact that Gomulka was not publicly criticized by Moscow for allowing such outbursts as these is in part evidence that the Soviet leaders, having reluctantly accepted Gomulka's victory, were as anxious as Warsaw to avoid undue provocations. This contrasts significantly with their hyper-sensitivity toward comment from Yugoslav sources.

Cross-currents in the Communist Bloc

On the whole, relations between and among the East European countries have not been seriously affected by the turbulent events of last fall. As might be expected, Tito has come in for a considerable amount of concerted criticism from the satellite regimes, particularly the Albanian and Czechoslovak Communists. Yet the complete break of 1948 has not been repeated, and no East European Communist Party has slammed the door on the chance to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs. Tito himself has expressed his pleasure at the recent easing of East European attitudes toward Yugoslavia.[13]

In the first weeks after the Polish October, strong criticism of the Gomulka Communists was voiced by both the Czechoslovak and the East German regimes. For example, Novotny, First Secretary of the Czech CP's Central Committee, declared in early December that "hostile voices and demagogic attitudes were able to gain strength in Poland because the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party did not oppose them sufficiently."[14] By now, however, the Czech leaders seem satisfied that the Polish example will not inspire their own people to similar demands, at least for the time being. This, combined with the relative stabilization of the situation in Poland, has led to a marked improvement of relations and renewed economic contacts between Prague and Warsaw.[15]

As for relations between Poland and Eastern Germany, there is no doubt that the maintenance of bloc ties is purely a *mariage de convenance*. The emergence of a more independent Communist regime in Warsaw must be anathema to the East German Communist lead-

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[10] Broadcast over Radio Belgrade November 15, 1956.

[11] *Trybuna Ludu,* May 16, 1957.

[12] *Ibid.,* November 3, 1956.

[13] *Politika,* May 25, 1957.

[14] *Rude Pravo,* Prague, December 8, 1956.

[15] Following Cyrankiewicz's visit to Prague in early May, agreements were signed to secure cooperation of the Czechoslovak and Polish engineering industries and to guarantee supplies of Polish sulphur for the Czechoslovak chemical industry.

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ers, who are among the most notorious exponents of Stalinism. But Ulbricht knows that the life of his regime depends on the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany, and that the security of their lines of communication depends in turn on the state of Polish-Soviet relations; thus he is apt to tread softly in dealings with Gomulka. Gomulka, on the other hand, has a vital stake in the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany, since—as has been noted—the Communists (on Moscow's instructions) are the only German political group prepared to endorse the Oder-Neisse frontier. Economic as well as political interests have compelled their fence-mending, as reflected in Gomulka's recent state visit to East Germany.

Tito's wholly different attitude toward the Ulbricht regime illustrates the point made earlier concerning his relative freedom of international maneuver *vis-à-vis* Gomulka's. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, there is no cause to take the East German regime seriously. Tito has diplomatic relations with Bonn but not with East Berlin, and official Yugoslav statements give support to the view that Germany should be reunited under conditions to be determined by the Germans themselves.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of evolving relations between the Communist countries has been the increased influence of Chinese communism on Eastern Europe. Since Stalin's death Mao Tse-tung's views have been accorded a growing respect by all Communist parties, including the CPSU. To the East European regimes, and particularly to the Polish regime, relations with Peiping have become second in importance only to relations with Moscow. Soon after Gomulka's ascension to power, the Polish Communists showed themselves anxious to establish a community of ideological views with the Chinese leaders. For example, on December 2, 1956, *Trybuna Ludu* paid tribute to "the wise and experienced Chinese Communist Party" and acclaimed Mao's current catch-phrase, "let all flowers blossom — let diverse thoughts contend," adding that there was pressing need for Poland to apply this slogan. In January Chou En-lai made an official visit to Warsaw, and in April Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz returned the compliment. At the Ninth Plenum of the CC in May Gomulka recommended Mao's thesis as a slogan for his party, calling it "a bold step, hitherto unknown in the practice of building socialism." While there is, of course, a genuine similarity of outlook in Gomulka's views and Mao's new line, it might well be that the Poles are also looking towards Peiping for potential support against Moscow should the need arise. Certainly there is significance in the fact that the Polish press was the first to publish extensive excerpts from Mao's new ideological pronouncements.

The cordiality which has marked recent Sino-Polish relations has not been evident in Peiping's attitude towards Tito. The Chinese Communists have been careful to do nothing which might impair the unity of the socialist camp and therefore have given no encouragement to Tito. On the contrary, an article in *Jen-min jih-pao,* the party-run People's Daily in Peiping, expressed its "astonishment" at "the sallies against all socialist countries and many Communist parties" contained in Tito's Pula speech, and warned "the Yugoslav comrades that they have gone rather too far." The article went on to castigate Tito's alleged attempt to enlist Gomulka as his ally.[16]

Tito seems not too much concerned by this official snub from Peiping. During his tour of the Far East, the Yugoslav leader did not visit China. The home press made much, however, of his visit to India, pointing to it as an indication of Belgrade's importance and standing among the neutralist powers.

Comrades in Contrast

There remains the task of assessing relations between Gomulka and Tito themselves, which raises the question of how their respective "paths to socialism" compare and wherein they differ. Tito, for his part, has hailed Poland's assertion of independence in internal affairs as a wholly welcome development, probably regarding it as a vindication in some sense of his own long fight with Moscow. Partly because of genuine differences in viewpoint and partly because of the delicate situation between Tito and the Kremlin, Gomulka has been less wholehearted in his attitude toward the Yugoslav Communists. The Polish Communists do not deny that the existence of an independent Yugoslavia has had a considerable influence on their thoughts and actions, and particularly that they have followed Tito's policy in introducing workers' councils in industrial enterprises. At the same time they are adamant in stressing that Gomulka's Poland is not a copy of Tito's Yugoslavia. "Not everything that is happening in Yugoslavia is liked in Poland, and *vice versa,*" wrote *Zycie Warszawy* last January, adding, however, that this in no way precluded friendly relations between the two countries.[17]

Many of the outspoken views voiced in Warsaw last autumn in the initial flush of enthusiasm over Gomulka's victory have now been toned down in accordance with the regime's avowed desire to remain inside Moscow's "commonwealth" of socialist countries. But back in November the Poles were freer in defining some of the

[16] *Jen-min jih-pao,* December 29, 1956.

[17] January 4, 1957.

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fundamental differences between their own reaction to Stalinism and the outlook and policies of the Yugoslav regime. *Zycie Warszawy* wrote at that time (November 29):

> **Although we, like Yugoslavia, have set out on the road of workers' councils and economic decentralization, we are determined to avoid various Yugoslav errors and distortions. . . . Despite the great popularity of Yugoslavia in our country, we do not approve of all their political conceptions without criticism. It appears that in regard to organizational matters, public expression of opinion, socialist parliamentarianism and the democratic division of power and authority, we have moved farther away from Stalinist practice than our Yugoslav friends.**

It would be difficult to find a truer or more succinct summing up of the differences between Yugoslavia and Poland on the level of internal policy. It is another of those paradoxes of present-day Eastern Europe that Poland, still experimenting on a "road" chosen only six months ago, should have rejected much more of Stalinism than has Yugoslavia in nine years of independence from Moscow—whereas in foreign policy Poland must toe the line with the USSR, while Tito is relatively free to engage in his shrewd game of power politics.

Gomulka's "road," as noted earlier, has been subject to complex pressures from both the left and the right, accounting in part for the difference in his policies *vis-à-vis* Tito's. The relaxation of Stalinist terror released a considerable force of pent-up public opinion throughout Eastern Europe, as well as in the USSR. Even before Gomulka's reappearance on the political scene, Polish writers and intellectuals played an important part in directing attention to the failings and broken promises of previous regimes, thereby helping to create the atmosphere which enabled Gomulka to take over. Yet many of these intellectuals, along with others in the population, represent what Gomulka himself has called a revisionist threat to his policies, striving to turn them away from socialism. That Gomulka is worried about pressure from the left is indicated, among other signs, by his remarks last April to a congress of the Union of Socialist Youth: he complained of "intensified reactionary activity on a large scale" in the country and warned against "removing the blots from socialism by revisionist brushes." [18] The Polish leadership has now clearly called a halt on some of the more extreme suggestions of reform put forth by liberal elements.

At the same time, Gomulka has stood firm against the Stalinist right within the party. His speech to the Ninth Plenum constituted a firm restatement of the policies he advanced last October, and despite criticisms from the Stalinist faction he again carried the day. The resolutions adopted by the Central Committee on this occasion clearly vindicated his view as *vs.* those of the rightists, and the expulsion from the party of the notorious Muscovites Berman and Radkiewicz confirmed the new leadership's determination to break with the past.

By contrast, the ferment of the post-Stalin era seems to have had relatively little effect on Yugoslavia, or at least on Tito's position of entrenched power. Tito faces neither a right nor a left; he may have to deal with an occasional recalcitrant individual such as Djilas, but there are no signs of any concerted opposition factions in the Yugoslav party. More than any other East European Communist leader, Tito resembles Stalin in his ability to base a personal dictatorship on an obedient party bureaucracy.

In the area of political practice, perhaps the best contrast between Yugoslavia and the new Poland is afforded by the character of their respective legislatures. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly is as much a rubber stamp institution as any of the satellite "legislative" bodies. The Polish Sejm, although it does not compare with Western parliamentary institutions, does provide a limited forum for the expression of opinions which are at variance with the official view of the governing party. In allowing other political parties to have some voice in discussing the country's policies, Gomulka approaches the liberal views expressed a few years ago by the Yugoslav dissident Djilas—views which were rejected out of hand by Tito and which landed Djilas himself in jail.

IN THE ECONOMIC as in the political and foreign policy spheres, Gomulka's position is much more complicated than that of Tito. Tito left the Soviet bloc before Moscow's plans for its tight economic integration were put into action. While his experiments in industrial management have not been overly successful in improving economic conditions, he has received enough aid from abroad to prevent the Yugoslav living standard from falling below a "safety" level. Poland, on the other hand, has suffered deeply from the effects of economic integration with the USSR, which has meant in practice the subordination of Polish needs to the economic interests of Moscow. For years the Soviet milking of Polish resources has left the population to survive as best it could under conditions of desperate deprivation. Economic discontent, as symbolized by Poznan, was the driving force which carried the workers to the support of Gomulka and which gave substance to the shadow of intellectual polemics.

Poland's present economic situation remains grave. At

[18] *Trybuna Ludu*, April 26, 1957.

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the Ninth Plenum Gomulka revealed that wages had increased out of all proportion to production, and declared that this trend would have to be stopped. Barring substantial aid from other sources, Gomulka is dependent on Soviet benevolence and, above all, on his people's willingness to put up with their hardships for some years to come. Hunger is much more likely to bring Gomulka down than any ideological deviation or political pressure, either from the right or the left.

Mutual Protest and a Mutual Dilemma

As the basis of some summary remarks, it might be pointed out that in one area Gomulka and Tito speak as a single voice; that is in their mutual denial that they are "national Communists." While the Twentieth CPSU Congress proclaimed the right of every country to follow its own road to socialism, the Soviet leadership has been firm in insisting that this principle must not be confused with "national communism." The latter has been defined by party leader Ekaterina Furtseva as "nothing but an attempt to set the incorrectly understood national interest of one country against the common socialist interests of the working people of all countries." [19] Both the Yugoslav and the Polish Communists deny that their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism can be described as "national communism." In its defense against Soviet accusations, Belgrade alleges that this term was invented by the bourgeois press and has now been adopted by some Communist parties, but that it has never been used by the Yugoslav Communists themselves. The Communist organ *Borba* has asserted that the argument between the Yugoslav Communists and "conservative" elements in Communist parties elsewhere is in essence a question of socialist development; Yugoslavia's opponents are accused of "trying to conceal the true character of the quarrel by pretending that the bone of contention is nationalism and not the progress of socialism." [20] The Polish Communists, too, are very anxious to dissociate themselves from the taint of "national communism." At the Ninth Plenum, Gomulka declared: "We reject and will continue to reject all absurd attempts to look for national communism in our party."

Both Yugoslavia and Poland are pursuing policies which deviate considerably from those carried out in the USSR since 1917. Tito and Gomulka might resent any suggestions of "national communism," but they can scarcely deny that their specific roads are precisely that. They are both trying to make socialism, which is far from being universally popular in their countries, more palatable to masses. At the same time both are firm in stressing that the Leninist brand of socialism is their final goal. The process of combining the imposition of a disliked political system with the granting of limited freedom of expression is an extremely dangerous one. Sooner or later one of these trends must gain the upper hand and eliminate the other. This is true even of Tito's Yugoslavia, where the repressive trend has always been in the ascendant and where the momentum of nine years of inertia has helped to create a false sense of stability.

In Poland the ultimate clash between these two trends is likely to occur much sooner than in Yugoslavia: diverse thoughts are still contending and the many objective difficulties facing Gomulka cannot be solved by enthusiasm alone. On the contrary, an excess of enthusiasm might well wreck the Polish road to socialism.

By now it is highly unlikely that the Soviet leaders would adopt forcible methods to solve any potential controversy with Yugoslavia. While Tito's example may have generally influenced the trend of Communist countries toward greater independence from Moscow, his particular brand of socialism is not so attractive as to threaten direct contagion. Apart from prestige the Soviets have lost little by Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist bloc. By contrast the loss of Poland, a vital link in their strategic system, would be disastrous for them. As long as Gomulka's present policies are applied, the Soviet leaders will allow the Polish experiment to continue. However, it is hard to conceive that they would ever permit Poland to leave the so-called camp of socialism. The question remains whether the people of Poland will accept the *status quo* indefinitely.

[19] Speech at the Lenin commemoration rally in Moscow, published in *Pravda,* April 23, 1957.

[20] February 14, 1957.

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Workers' Councils in Poland

By Kazimierz Grzybowski

IN CONTRAST TO YUGOSLAVIA where they were planned from above, the workers' councils functioning today in Poland were the result of a spontaneous movement among the factory crews of Polish industrial enterprises. They are the Polish workingman's bid to control his own economic destiny and to create a genuinely representative institution in a land of fictitious "people's democracy." Already, during the Poznan uprising, factory crews pushed forward their demands and organized their action through *ad hoc* elected committees. Later, during the critical days of October-November 1956, all factories in the Warsaw area and some scattered at various places in the provinces were taken over by workers' councils. In Warsaw and elsewhere the councils either replaced the regular factory managements or gained control over their decisions.

The Statute on Workers' Councils adopted on November 19, 1956, was therefore a concession by the government to a popular *fait accompli.* It constitutes a link between the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka and the achievements of the revolutionary period, and it provides the legal basis for the operation of a new institution and the exercise of newly-won freedoms.[1]

The workers' councils created by this law are the primary units of the economic administration, subordinate in the last instance to the various economic ministries of the government. They provide the basic instrumentality for ironing out conflicts of interest between labor and management and assuring their cooperation in running economic enterprises. The composition of the councils represents a compromise between two opposed principles: The first aims at unitary factory management and is reflected in the provision giving the factory director *ex officio* membership on the council of his plant. The second recognizes, on the other hand, that there is a conflict of interest between labor and management; it is reflected in the prohibition of the factory director, or his deputy, from holding the position of council chairman. In addition, the law stipulates that not more than one-third of the members of a council shall be persons holding administrative or managerial jobs.

The factory director, as *ex-officio* council member, occupies a very special position. On the one hand, he is obligated to keep the council fully informed of what he is doing and how he is executing its resolutions. On the other, as the council's executive officer, he may act without its prior consent in exceptional circumstances, provided that he later notifies the council and obtains its approval. At the same time the director is bound by the directives of the higher authorities of the state economic administration and must give them precedence over the resolutions of the council. Where a conflict occurs, it is his duty to enforce the will of the authorities. He may also refuse in the first instance to execute a council order if—and only if—he deems it contrary to government laws or the state economic plan. In that case the matter goes to a higher authority, which decides either for the director or for the council.

Factory or enterprise directors continue to be government appointees, but their appointments now require the prior consent of the workers' councils. The councils also have the right to recommend their own choice for the posts of director or deputy-director in their respective plants, as well as the right to demand the dismissal and replacement of government appointees already occupying these positions.

THE BASIC LAW contains several provisions intended to ensure the ability of the councils to resist pressures from the factory managements and effectively protect the interests of the workers. For one thing, it stipulates that the councils' statutes shall be formulated by general meetings of the factory crews, to which the councils are solely responsible. Further, no provision is made for the dissolution of the councils by higher authorities, nor does the law make any reference to "democratic centralism" as a basis for subordinating them to the ad-

[1] For text of Statute on Workers' Councils, see Dziennik Ustaw, 51/238/1956.

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ministration. Elections of council members are by secret ballot, and those elected cannot be fired from their jobs as long as they are serving on the council.

Council meetings are always open to members of the factory crew, and certain matters—in particular, the disposition of the "enterprise fund" (that part of the profit which is distributed among the crew)—can be dealt with by the councils only in conference with crew representatives or at general workers' meetings. In special cases the councils have the right to initiate a referendum, which gives them a powerful means of mobilizing the workers' support in the event of a conflict with the management.

On the other hand, the councils are subject, in the exercise of their authority, to such limitations as are imposed by the laws in force and by the national economic plans. All council decisions affecting production schedules for an individual plant must be based upon the current national plan: in other words, the production tasks which individual factories must perform continue to be assigned from the top and cannot be altered by the workers' councils.

In the general economic structure, then, the workers' councils—both in character and in origin—constitute a source of authority distinct from the higher echelons of the economic administration. Their representative character is visible in the method of their election as well as in the way they settle disputes not only with the government-appointed managements but also with the trade union organization.

This leads to the question of the division of authority between the councils, participating in factory management, and the shop committees, which are the organs of the trade unions in individual plants and whose domain is social welfare and insurance, safety and hygiene, etc.[2] While this division is by no means clearly defined, the councils as a general rule must consult the shop committees about all managerial decisions touching matters within the latter's sphere of responsibility.

Some matters which formerly were the concern of the shop committees, such as wages, have now come under the simultaneous purview of the workers' councils. During the discussions preceding the enactment of the Statute on Workers' Councils, the problem of overlapping jurisdictions between the councils and the shop committees was pointed out. The proponents of the councils argued that these bodies should operate as organs of worker participation in management, and that the shop committees' administrative functions impinging on this sphere should be restricted so as to enable them to perform effectively their own proper role as organs of social control over management.[3] Controversy on this question, however, is still continuing.

EVEN THIS summary picture makes it clear that many ambiguities remain to be ironed out before the exact place and sphere of authority of the workers' councils in the economic structure of Poland will be clearly established. But their future is in doubt on still other grounds. Most important, there is the formidable barrier presented by the established Soviet-style administrative machinery, which does not mesh with genuine elective institutions. The press has reported countless instances of the unequal struggle presently being waged between local democratic initiative and the deadweight of administrative routine rooted in the centralized administration of the past. The bureaucracy has by no means abandoned the fight to protect its vested interests: in many places, elections to the councils have been far from freely conducted; in others, the government-controlled factory administrations have been obstructing any real participation by the councils in the actual business of management.

These discouragements have evoked pessimistic predictions that it will prove impossible to "marry democracy to bureaucracy," [4] and that the democratic experiment which the workers' councils represent will inevitably fail unless the present centralized system of national economic administration is relaxed, or even abolished. Failing this, it is feared that the councils, instead of becoming effective organs of worker participation in management and, in a broader sense, of working-class self-government, will be reduced to mere debating societies, or at best to protectors of the workers' welfare, in which case they would do little more than double for the old shop committees. Already many of the councils have become entangled in endless quarrels with the administrative bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the initial success scored in gaining legal recognition of the councils has been enough to stimulate their supporters to put forward various plans and suggestions which, were they to materialize, would

[2] Shop committees were originally created on February 6, 1945, when it was decreed that one member of the shop committee should also be a member of the managerial board of the enterprise. Later, the managerial boards were replaced by single directors with dictatorial powers, on the Soviet model. The shop committees then ceased to have representation or participation in the management of enterprises and became converted into local trade union organs.

[3] K. Kakol, "O reforme roli i metod pracy zwiazkow zawodowych," (On Reforming the Role and Work Methods of the Trade Unions), *Przeglad Zagadnien Socjalnych*, No. 10, 1956, p. 39.

[4] Cz. Chelstowski, "Samorzad rabotniczy w niebezpieczenstwie," (Workers' Councils in Danger), *Prosto z Mostu*, January 20, 1957.

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mean a far-reaching reorientation of the whole Polish economic system. The press has noted, for example, that the councils, in seeking ways to satisfy their common needs, are tending to venture outside the constricting framework of the individual enterprise. Thus, plans are being made to start various types of workers' cooperatives—housing, consumer services, *etc.*—the funds for which would be provided by the councils on a wider basis than a single enterprise, or even than a whole single industry.[5] The end effect of such local initiatives could be to unite the councils in a broader type of activity which would thus be kept outside the realm of direct and exclusive government concern.

Far more serious and disturbing from the regime's standpoint have been suggestions which would make the councils the starting point of a process of change liberating broad areas of the economy from governmental control. At a conference of representatives of workers' councils, held in Warsaw, it was pointed out that the establishment of the councils, involving participation by the factory crews not merely in enterprise management but profits as well, means in fact a fundamental change in the character of the ownership of nationalized enterprises: that is, they now combine elements of both public and cooperative ownership. It was further argued that, in the future, industries should be classed according to their nature and run differently: those of national importance, such as communications, transport and defense, to remain publicly owned and centrally administered; those of mixed character to be organized as cooperatives with government participation; and some small industries, such as luxury goods and food, to be wholly freed from government interference in their operation.[6]

Such plans, however, received little encouragement from Gomulka's speech to the Ninth Plenary Session of the PZPR Central Committee in May 1957.[7] The speech made it plain that Gomulka, while regarding the workers' councils as a natural reaction to the excessive bureaucratization and centralization of the previous regime, does not by any means consider them the sole medium of worker participation in managing the country's economy, and believes that this could be achieved just as well through the shop committees and trade union organization. His remarks also left no doubt of his insistence that the councils conform in their operation to the principle of centralized planning and administration. Pouring cold water on hopes for a basic change in the present economic regime, he declared:

> **If every factory became a kind of cooperative enterprise of the workers, all the laws governing capitalist enterprise would immediately come into effect and produce all the usual results. Central planning and administration . . . would have to disappear. . . . Prices of goods . . . would be determined by the market . . . Every factory would determine its production independently of other factories. Investments would be dictated by the market, only with a worse result than under capitalism, because a capitalist is himself the owner of the factory and can thus devote an overwhelming part of the profits to investments . . . [while] workers as collective owners of a factory . . . would always have a tendency to raise their earnings as much as possible, without giving thought to investment.**

GOMULKA'S PREOCCUPATION with industrial efficiency led him to reject the broader potentialities of the workers' councils as democratic institutions. He insisted that their role be confined to raising the efficiency of factory management and ridiculed the idea that the principle of elective workers' self-government should be extended upward to the level of industrial branch administration. Nothing would be gained by this, he argued, since elective councils would find it necessary to employ staffs of bureaucrats with expert knowledge.

Although admitting that the failure of the trade unions under the old regime made the workers' councils necessary, Gomulka insisted that the trade unions should remain the more important of the two and should control the workers' councils. Specifically, he proposed two measures which would tie the councils to the trade unions: (1) disputes between workers' councils and factory managements should be settled by arbitration boards composed of representatives of the trade unions and of the higher echelons of the state economic administration; (2) the trade unions should be entrusted with general guidance of the councils with respect to their activities and role in the national economy.

Gomulka delivered another blow to the councils in the matter of elections. Factory workers must have the right of free choice of their representatives on the councils, he acknowledged, but local committees of the United Polish Workers' Party should "point out . . . the candidates . . . whose election would be the best guarantee of the successful work of the councils." This gives added confirmation to the impression that the pattern of elections is one of the features of Polish public life least affected by the October revolution.

Gomulka's program undoubtedly reflects the line which the regime will endeavor to implement in the immediate future. In essence it appears to signify an intention not to depart from the basic principle of bureaucratic management, but rather to mend the fences of the old order without significantly changing its nature

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[5] *Przeglad Kulturalny,* January 23, 1957.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Full text published in *Nowe Drogi,* June 1957.

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or mode of operation. However, the implementation of the program will not proceed in an atmosphere of total public acquiescence. One thing is certain: the workers' councils are the only national institution which has not been discredited in the public eye as one of the "Stalinist fictions of democracy." The public has placed its hopes in them for the re-establishment of some kind of liberal and democratic government. The press is keeping a watchful eye on developments affecting the councils, and any tendency on the regime's part to check their development and restore the old order is noted with alarm and anger.

While Gomulka's personal appeal cannot be doubted, the party as a whole is not enjoying a season of popularity in Poland. The public still retains its autonomy of ideas and views, and it wishes to control the means of expressing them. It considers the councils one of the important channels of such expression, quite apart from their significance as a major innovation in the administrative machinery of the Polish state.

THE WORKERS COUNCILS CORNER

QUERY: *An Amusing Incident.* Something rather amusing has happened on our workers council: out of sixteen members not a single one is a worker. This strange turn of events has aroused discontent in the plant, and one hears complaints that this isn't really a workers council, but a fraud.

REPLY: There are always malcontents, but don't be concerned about such petty matters. Just to be on the safe side, however, do get yourselves one worker. At least for representational purposes. It never hurts.

QUERY: *Disenchanted.* It's been three months since we've had a workers council in our plant. The council meets incessantly, enacts all sorts of reorganizations, shifts people around, pays attention to labor discipline, keeps an eye on goods and resources; but when I asked the chairman, Engineer Banach, when they'll distribute the money, he said: "What's the matter with you, can't you keep your shirt on—am I magician or something?"

REPLY: A good lesson for the future. Instead of an engineer, you should have elected a magician. Don't you have one on hand?

QUERY: *Ingratitude.* Our workers council is extremely active. We get together every week, and sometimes even more frequently. We discuss the national economic plan, we plan the further consolidation of individual ministries, we establish their spheres of competence, *etc.* Recently we worked out detailed projects regarding the liquidation of central administrative bodies. We're hurt by the fact that there are comrades who don't appreciate our contribution and bluntly imply that we should occupy ourselves with plant matters.

REPLY: Don't pay any attention to that. It is their envy which speaks. The devil with plant matters! There'll be time for that, once you've settled the national economic policy.

QUERY: *Conflict.* A sharp conflict developed between our council and the management. We're convinced that we are right, and they're convinced that they are right. We would like to get an impartial source to look into this quarrel, but in the meantime the central agency takes the side of the management, and the ministry takes the side of the central agency. Whom shall we turn to for arbitration?

REPLY: For the time being, the only choice is the good Lord, dear comrades. Lord help you!

By Mariusz Kwiatkowski in Szpilki (Warsaw), May 5, 1957.

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Soviet Prospects in the Middle East

By Walter Z. Laqueur

AMONG THE MOST CRITICAL factors affecting world politics today is Moscow's concerted effort to expand its influence in the Middle Eastern countries. Some political analysts trace current Soviet strategy in this area to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, referring variously to an article by Lenin in 1912, to essays by Stalin in the early 1920's, to the Baku Congress of 1920, *etc.* Quotations from these sources, however, are no more relevant than certain kinds of Soviet "statistics"; they can prove anything. The fact is that Soviet preoccupation with the Middle East is a phenomenon of recent date. The tacit assumption under Stalin was that a rapprochement with the new national governments which had emerged in the Middle East (and in Asia in general) after World War II was out of the question, for the simple reason that these countries had not really become independent but remained colonies or semi-colonies. It may be recalled that one of the main charges against the famous Soviet economist Eugene Varga in 1947 was his contention that some importance should after all be attributed to the new status of certain Asian countries. Whether Stalin might have modified his attitude had he lived longer may be of speculative interest. But he showed no inclination to do so up until his death in 1953; the decisive change in Soviet policy came only in the spring or summer of 1955, undoubtedly preceded by a serious review of Kremlin strategy in influential quarters.

The Party Line Somersaults

A measure of the change in Soviet outlook is provided by Moscow's about-face toward Egypt. When the Naguib-Nasser regime came to power in July 1952, it was at first denounced as madly reactionary, cruel, anti-democratic, terrorist.[1] A book on Egypt published in 1953 defined the policy of the new government as "demagogic" and "anti-working-class," and argued that the "progressive" military leaders who had originally belonged to the junta had been excluded.[2] In 1954 the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was condemned by a Soviet Academy of Sciences publication as "contrary to the national interests of Egypt and the other Arab countries." Rather ominously it was stated that "the Egyptian toilers would have to fight many a battle before the victory of real democracy."[3]

By early 1955, however, these criticisms had been toned down. A volume printed in May 1955 still criticized the Cairo government for its "anti-popular measures" such as "restricting the rights of the workers, defending the big feudal landowners against revolutionary measures," and so on.[4] But such unfriendly remarks had virtually ceased, and soon thereafter the leading theme in Soviet publications (and, more important, in Soviet policy) became friendship and support for Egypt. By June the Cairo leaders were winning praise from Moscow radio for their stand against Western defense pacts and for their neutralism. After the Bandung conference, Nasser was commended for having contributed a "great deal to the success of Bandung, supporting the principle of peaceful co-existence."[5]

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[1] L. Vatolina, *Imperialisticheskaia Borba za Afriku* (Imperialist Struggle for Africa), Moscow, Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1953, pp. 123-27.

[2] S. S. Gordonov, *Egipet* (Egypt), Moscow, Gosizdat Geograficheskoi Literatury, 1953, p. 120.

[3] *Narody Afriki* (The People of Africa), D. Z. Olderogee and I. I. Potekhin, eds., Moscow Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1954, p. 213.

[4] K. Ode-Vassileva, in her postscript to *Rasskazy arabskikh pisatelei,* (Tales of Arabic Writers) Moscow, Izdatelstvo inostranoi literartury, 1955, p. 182.

[5] *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn,* Vol. 7, 1955, p. 84.

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A similar change took place in Moscow's attitude toward the other Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq which had joined the Baghdad Pact. Nothing dramatic happened to Soviet relations with Turkey and Persia, though certain efforts were made to "normalize" relations. In its attitude toward Israel, however, Moscow clearly showed its opportunistic face. As long as the Kremlin believed that it had no prospects with the Arab countries it had supported Israel, counting on this to serve as a factor of instability in the area. A natural result of the rapprochement with the Arab countries was that Soviet policy toward Israel became more and more hostile.

Ideological Justifications

The ideological reasoning behind the new line was given in a number of speeches and articles during 1956.[6] It was now argued that the "national bourgeoisie" (hitherto depicted as the faithful ally of imperialism) was, in effect, at present fulfilling a progressive role in the liberation movement of most Asiatic countries. Sovereignty had been achieved in a number of countries under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie (not the workers or peasants) by the application of peaceful means. The fight for national liberation presented, as one Soviet author put it, "a fairly-checkered picture," composed of strong religious and nationalist elements and ideas, and repeating various phases of the struggle through which the West had passed many years ago. However, modern forms of production were as yet the exception in Asia, the argument continued, and this was reflected in the ideologies still prevailing among the ruling sections and characterizing these regimes.

These modifications in the Soviet attitude were of the greatest political importance. They implied that the closest possible collaboration with the new governments and movements in the Middle East was desirable and that the alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" in Asia, or more specifically in the Arab countries, was to last for some time; for as long as it led the struggle against the West, it would continue to play a "progressive role." And yet, however important their political implications, these changes did not affect basic Soviet contentions: that the present regimes were only transient stages in the progress toward communism in Asia and the Middle East, and that full victory could be achieved only after the leadership had passed from the national bourgeoisie into the hands of the working class. No secret has been made of this wider perspective.[7]

The fact that there was an ideological justification for the new line and a general concept as to how things were to develop in the Middle East is of undoubted interest and importance. But it does not mean that such ideological considerations *caused* the changes in Soviet Middle Eastern policy—they followed it. The change that took place in 1955 can be explained without reference to ideological schemes. Moscow realized at that time that the Middle East had become a highly explosive area in world politics, stirred by deep tensions and conflicts. It assumed that by further inflaming nationalist passions these conflicts and tensions could be intensified and directed against the West. (The antiquated idea that communism was interested only in *social* conflicts had long since been discarded; in Asia, as some observers have put it, the cold war had replaced the class war.) What made the Middle East and the Arab countries particularly promising was the fact that owing to a specific set of historical circumstances, national and religious traditions, and perhaps national psychology, they offered a most fertile ground for extremist anti-Western movements.

Without going into detail, the beginning of the Soviet political offensive in the Middle East can be traced from the visit of Mr. Shepilov (then merely editor of *Pravda*) to Cairo in the summer of 1955. The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal which followed, as was subsequently admitted by Colonel Nasser, had really been concluded with Moscow, not Prague. During the various crises of 1956, from the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company to the Sinai war and Port Said expedition, Soviet foreign policy came out squarely in favor of Egypt's demands, and gave full support to the demands of the other Arab powers in every possible way.[8] These demands, as formulated by the "liberated Arab countries" (Egypt and Syria), nowhere clashed with Soviet interests, but all along the line came into conflict with the interests of Western Europe: the Suez Canal, the threat to Middle Eastern oil, Israel and Turkey. Aside from expenses for political propaganda, there was no

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[6] The most important are: the editorials in *Sovetskoe Vostokoyedenie,* No. 1 and No. 5, 1956; V. Semyonov, *Kommunist,* No. 18, 1956; M. E. Zhukov, *Partiinaia zhizn,* August, 1956.

[7] In discussions of the alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" in the 1920's the epithets uses by Soviet authors were invariably "conditional and provisional." The epithets used in 1957 are "sincere and lasting." This does not necessarily mean that a longer period of collaboration is envisaged in 1957. It *does* mean that without psychological build-up the stress on lasting friendship and alliance would not be possible at all in 1957.

[8] All the relevant documents are contained in D. T. Shepilov, *Suezkii vopros* (The Suez Problem), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1956.

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great sacrifice involved in Moscow's pretending to champion these aspirations.

The main danger from the Soviet point of view was (and is) that the Arab countries would realize they were paying for Soviet support by impeding their own progress. As long as they remained embroiled with foreign enemies, real or imagined, they would not be able to tackle their own domestic problems. And as long as they did not tackle their domestic problems, communism could make progress in this part of the world. Unfortunately, such a sober assessment seems very remote in the Middle East of today, with national passions, fanned by Soviet foreign policy, running high.

The Economic and Cultural Offensive

The Soviet political offensive has been matched, though in a less spectacular way, in the fields of economics and cultural propaganda. The amount of trade between the Arab countries and the Soviet bloc (plus China) rose considerably in 1955-56, and many new trade agreements were signed. The Egyptian-Soviet arms deal amounted to about 300-350 million dollars, and Egypt thus incurred a heavy debt. In 1956 about 40 percent of Egypt's cotton went to the Soviet bloc, compared to 14 percent in 1954. Of the billion dollars worth of credit granted since 1954 by Moscow to non-Communist countries, Egypt has received more than a third—the biggest share of any nation including India—indicating clearly how much importance was attributed to relations with Cairo. Most other Communist countries also have made loans to Egypt, Syria and, to a lesser degree, the rest of the Arab countries. East Germany, Hungary, Poland and others in the Communist camp sent high-ranking economic delegations to the Arab capitals, took a prominent part in trade fairs, and with state assistance occasionally undercut the West in their tenders for building industrial plants or communication networks.

The motives behind this trade expansion in the Middle East were almost exclusively political and strategic, as shown by the fact that Moscow was far more willing to provide arms than to participate in projects for peaceful economic construction. This emerged clearly in the summer of 1956. Until then Moscow hinted that it would be only too glad to finance the Aswan high dam if Western assistance were not forthcoming. However, after the announcement that Western loans would not be given at once, the USSR retreated and announced that it did not believe the project to be of great urgency.

Soviet cultural propaganda, too, was stepped up during 1955-56. Thirty-three Soviet and satellite cultural delegations visited Egypt, and thirty-four Egyptian groups went to the Soviet bloc countries. In August 1956 Sergei Kaftanov, RSFSR Deputy Minister of Culture, toured the Middle East and signed a broad agreement with Syria covering exchanges in the fields of science, arts, general and technical education, physical training and sports, pooling of cultural information, exchange of films, scholarships, students, and so on. Similar agreements were later signed with other Arab countries.[9] In early 1957 Moscow sent a Soviet film festival and ballet company to Cairo, and various Egyptian and Sudanese delegations visited the USSR. The Stalin peace prize was conferred in 1956 on a Syrian Imam, Shaikh Muhammad al Ashmar, and the pilgrimage of Soviet Muslims to Mecca continued. Soviet newspapers during 1956 and early 1957 published frequent interviews with visiting writers, composers and painters from Arab countries, and reported their willingness to learn from Soviet rather than Western models. Such reports were perhaps exaggerated, but there is no doubt that Soviet culture made a considerable impact on some Arab countries—certainly more than on the countries of East Europe, which had received cultural exports from the East in a more critical spirit. Political considerations played a part in this impact of course; it is significant that Soviet cultural exports made a far greater impression in Egypt than in Lebanon, for example.

To sum up thus far, Soviet policy in the Middle East has to its credit some important achievements. But the Soviet involvement in this area has simultaneously given birth to many problems and complications that did not exist in the past and that will to a growing extent bedevil Soviet policy in the future. Until 1955 the Soviet position in the Middle East was very advantageous indeed: "Western imperialists" were the "ins" and the Soviets were the "outs." As a result Moscow could point to its unselfish disinterest *vis-à-vis* the Middle East, asserting that its only ambition was to see these countries free and independent, in contrast to the West which wanted to "enslave" them. Seen from Cairo or Beirut, the Soviet Union appeared in 1954 a very faraway country—there simply was no danger "from the North."

This, however, is no longer the case in 1957. In order to understand Moscow's present position, the problems raised by more direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East must be examined.

The Religious Question

One of the issues that has become topical, and from the Soviet point of view a rather sensitive subject, is Moscow's attitude towards Islam and the Muslim peoples of the USSR. Soviet overtures to the Arab countries

[9] A fuller survey of Soviet cultural activities is given in Ivar Spector, "Soviet Cultural Propaganda in the Near and Middle East," *Soviet Survey,* (London) June-July 1957.

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have not basically affected its opposition to the "reactionary essence" of Islam and "Pan-Islamism"; in fact, hostility to the Islamic religion has recently been expressed by references to the "cult of Muhammad" in terms of the "cult of the individual." [10] At the same time, the tone of Soviet anti-Islamic publications has been softened, and Soviet writers are now ready to admit that certain religious dignitaries in Indonesia, Syria and Egypt have played a progressive role in the "struggle for liberation." There has been also some modification in the official Soviet attitude toward the national traditions of the Central Asian minorities under its control and toward such Muslim heroes as Shamil, a nineteenth century North Caucasian leader previously condemned as a reactionary. Explicit and complete rehabilitation of such leaders has been opposed, however.

INTERESTINGLY, Soviet hostility towards Islam has not yet made a great impact on the Middle East. When Western representatives have called attention to Soviet attacks on Islam (for instance, Klimovich's recent brochure), Arab publicists have argued that this was a Western calumny and probably untrue—and that even if true, such attacks were irrelevant because they could not do any damage to Islam.[11] Some newspapers have tried to claim that the Soviet attitude toward Islam has basically changed: Moscow was no longer hostile, it had built or restored ten mosques in the USSR during 1956, had allowed some believers to go to Mecca, and so on.

This reaction must have caused some surprise among readers, for the same spokesmen who condoned the Soviet attitude toward Islam were usually the most outspoken about the persecution of their co-religionists in practically every other part of the world. Their seeming indifference to the fate of the Muslims in the USSR can be explained historically: during the forty years of Soviet rule Central Asia has been sealed off from the Middle East, and the Soviet Muslims in effect have been largely forgotten. Some Middle Easterners may find it inconvenient to be reminded of them at the present time, for it is realized—if only vaguely—that condoning Soviet policy in Central Asia is part of the price for Soviet support in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Moscow's hostile attitude towards Islam may in the near future become more of a headache to Soviet policy-makers than it is at present. In that case, it is not impossible that the Soviet government would put a temporary embargo on anti-Islamic propaganda. It may well be that Moscow could afford such a closed season for a few years. The remnants of Islamic religion in the USSR may constitute a social and disciplinary problem, but it is doubtful that they are still a factor of major political importance. [12]

The Growth of Anti-communism

The direct intervention of the Soviet Union in the Middle East has rallied and consolidated the counterforces within the area. From the very beginning Middle Eastern governments have differed in their appraisal of the character and desirability of Soviet intervention. These differences have grown and are bound to spread as Soviet involvement becomes more palpably felt. This is a serious danger to Moscow's designs, and it is significant that Soviet spokesmen have made considerable efforts to create the impression that Soviet activities in the Middle East were welcomed by all, or at least by all but one of the Arab governments. King Saud has not been criticized despite his pact with the United States, and Moscow studiously has refrained from singling out King Hussein for his part in the Jordan crisis, despite his denunciation of "international communism." (Unnamed "reactionary circles" were blamed for the Jordan developments in April 1957.) The Lebanese government, on the other hand, has been attacked in the Soviet press for its cooperation with the West, perhaps because Lebanon was not a participant in the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordan-Saudi bloc that had emerged in 1956.

How can one explain the remarkable restraint displayed by Moscow in the face of the unfriendly actions by King Saud and King Hussein?

The reason undoubtedly is that the original Soviet plan was to neutralize and win over as much as possible the entire Arab world (except, of course, Iraq, which under the present government was a hopeless proposition from the Soviet point of view). For this reason Moscow wanted to prevent a split on pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet lines among the Arab countries. But the logic of events was such that the more pronounced Soviet involvement became, the more likely—indeed inevitable—such a split became. As long as Russia was "out", the Middle Eastern governments could feel that Soviet policy was not an urgent problem. But

[10] H. Carrère d'Encausse, "La Destalinization dans L'Islam Sovietique" (Destalinization in Soviet Islam), *"L'Afrique et L'aise,"* No. 37, 1957; G. E. Wheeler, "Recent Attitudes Towards Islam," *Soviet Survey,* No. 15, 1957.

[11] *Al Ahram* (Cairo), April 21, 1957. The reference is to USIA's reproduction in Cairo of excerpts from a brochure by L. Klimovich: *Islam, its origin and social character,* originally published in Russian, in *Znanie,* Moscow, 1956.

[12] For a detailed discussion of the status of Soviet Moslems, see "The Soviet Impact on Central Asia," by Richard E. Pipes, in *Problems of Communism,* Vol. VI, No.2, March-April 1957.

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once the USSR had moved into the area, each was compelled to take a stand.

It seems virtually certain that this is gradually becoming the major political problem in the area. Differences of opinion with regard to the USSR may be glossed over temporarily, but such compromises cannot be expected to hold very long. Similarly, Moscow wants to postpone as long as possible any split between the various Arab governments, but sooner or later it will be compelled to take sides in a conflict it has helped to provoke. In other words: Moscow will have to come out in favor of the "progressive" against the "reactionary" governments. That this will happen seems a foregone conclusion; how it will work out in detail is impossible to predict. But there is no doubt that the emergence of two blocs will contribute to a clarification of the situation. This, for obvious reasons, is not at all to Moscow's liking.

The Middle Eastern Communist Parties

Another major problem for Moscow is the activities of the Middle Eastern Communist parties. Communist parties exist in all major Arab countries, and it is of course Moscow's wish that these parties should one day rule. During the past few years most of them have greatly expanded and their influence has increased. But the conditions for their growth and progress toward political power are unequal in the various countries. Furthermore, the rise of communism in one country has been accompanied by a rise of anti-communism in others, and this process will continue. Two years ago many people in the Middle East still declared that communism was not a major political issue in the area. Today the situation is radically changed.

The Arab Communists have tried to counter these dangers by pointing out time and again that they are not "separatists" but part and parcel of the Arab national movement. Khaled Bakhdash, head of the Syrian Communists, has declared in the Syrian parliament, for instance, that the Syrian Communist Party was in favor of Arab nationalism and "nothing else in addition." [13] The Syrian and Lebanese parties have long since ceased their overt anti-religious propaganda and have dropped their demands for agrarian reform, formerly one of the main planks of their program. The leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party have published a letter from prison in which they express their wholehearted, and unreserved support for Colonel Nasser's policy.[14] In Iraq and Jordan the Communists have shifted most of their activities from the illegal underground parties to respectable and semi-legal "national fronts," "blocs," or "conferences" which make no specific socialist demands. The Arab Communist parties have been so anxious to drop most of the "socialist ballast" of their programs that they are now less radical on domestic issues than, say, the Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) party in Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

All this may serve as a partial smoke-screen. But such tactics cannot be completely successful for the simple reason that the Communists parties continue to exist, and it is not altogether unknown that their ultimate ambitions are very different from their present moderate stand. It is also known that they are in close contact (to put it mildly) with Moscow and that essentially they remain "foreign" parties, which in the long run is a very dangerous thing to be in the highly charged nationalist atmosphere of the Middle East. The Communists have attempted to counter any such line of thought by outshining all others in the nationalist fervor of their anti-Israeli and anti-Western slogans.

Both from the doctrinal and political point of view, Moscow is confronted with a predicament for which there are no easy solutions: in the long run the Middle Eastern Communist parties, some of which have already emerged as major political forces, are an important asset. But as far as the present is concerned they are a source of embarrassment, and Moscow will have to do a great deal of clever tactical maneuvering to steer clear of difficult situations. Middle Eastern Communists apparently have been "advised" not only to forget about socialist reforms for the time being, but also not to adhere too closely to another once basic tenet of Leninism, "proletarian internationalism."

International Repercussions

Other difficulties exist on the level of international relations. The attraction which the Soviet Union holds for some sections of the population in the Middle East consists of mutally exclusive factors. The Soviet Union has to appear high on the crest of the wave of the future (like Germany and Italy in the late 1930's) because weakness has never evoked much esteem in the Middle East. On the other hand, this strength must not be too much in evidence, lest it arouse the fears of the highly suspicious political élites in these parts. This demands much discreet and subtle maneuvering

[13] Bakhdash declared in the same speech that "Syria is not Communist; it is nationalist and Arab, and will remain so." See A. Benningsen, "Le front national dans la nouvelle strategie communiste au moyen-Orient" (The National Front in the New Communist Strategy for the Middle East), *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), No. 5, 1956, p. 620.

[14] *Ibid.*, quoted by Benningsen.

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behind the scenes on the part of Soviet diplomats and other emissaries.

The complications created for Soviet policy in Western Europe as a result of its activities in the Middle East are also difficult, though apparently not crucial. If the present Soviet aim were to make headway in Europe—primarily by recapturing the spirit of Geneva —it would probably have to tone down its anti-Western campaign in the Middle East. But the general impression gained over the last months is that Moscow does not consider Europe a very promising terrain for its policy of "peaceful coexistence", whereas the Middle East, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, offers definite possibilities of success. Consequently, there is no point in its wooing the West and making major concessions—its smiles should be concentrated on the Middle East.

The main problem for Moscow is how to counter American foreign policy in the Middle East. Geographcally, the United States is much farther away from the area than the USSR, which should make it less suspect in Arab eyes. Unlike other Western powers, the US has had no Middle Eastern colonies, nor has it followed an anti-Muslim policy towards a large Muslim minority, as has the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union cannot compete at present with American offers of technical help and economic assistance. These disadvantages explain the intense Soviet propaganda efforts to present the United States as a "neo-colonial" power which wants to "enslave and exploit the free Arab nations." Hence also the stress put time and again on the allegation that the Soviet Union merely wants a neutral and free Middle East, whereas the West wishes to ensnare it in all kinds of military pacts and alliances. Whether the "positive neutralism" sponsored by Soviet spokesmen for the benefit of the Middle East is either positive or neutral is highly debatable. But there can be no doubt that the slogan has been very effective in view of the strong trend in the Middle East to keep away from great power conflicts (and perhaps to join the stronger camp at a later stage).

All of the above observations on the factors affecting Soviet policy in the Middle East may be summarized simply: seen from Moscow, the Middle East has by 1957 become the most promising area for the extension of Soviet and Communist influence. But carrying out this aim is hardly a matter of clear sailing for Soviet policy planners and local Communist leaders, for there are crucial obstacles to overcome. The outcome will depend in part on Western policy, but it is mainly the Arab governments and political élites who must choose between making it easier, or very difficult, for Moscow to pursue its expansionist road.

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Decontrols or New Controls?

The "Reform" of Soviet Agricultural Administration

By Roy D. Laird

A NOTED POLITICAL SCIENTIST wrote of the Soviet system in 1948:

> **Power reaches so far into the everyday affairs of every man that those who wield it have levers whereby to control every aspect of life. To expect them to refrain from so doing is contrary to our psychology of power—unless some as yet undeveloped safeguards can be applied.** [1]

An excellent test of the contemporary applicability of this view is afforded by the evolving situation on the Soviet agricultural front in the post-Stalin era.

Since 1953 the Soviet regime has introduced a number of measures designed to alleviate the chronic ills which have plagued Soviet agriculture for well over two decades. Important among these measures has been an extensive "reform" in agricultural administration, aimed at achieving the advantages of decentralization without sacrificing the controls essential to a totalitarian economy; in this sense it has paved the way for the recent, highly-publicized decentralization drive in Soviet industry and construction. The stated goals of the reform are not only "to assure the most rational labor organization" and "planning system" in agriculture, but also to increase peasant "initiative" and to "enable the collective farms to decide for themselves, even more independently than before, questions in collective farm life." [2] Clearly the implications of these goals are such that were they to be achieved to any significant degree, political analysts sharing the above view of the Communist compulsion to control would have to reexamine their understanding of the fundamental workings of the Soviet system. As will be shown, however, the professed aims of the reform have been substantially different from its effects in operation. The present paper will analyze the impact of various measures which have been enacted in an attempt to shed light on the basic problem facing the Soviet leadership—the dilemma of decentralization *vs.* control.

The Problem of Peasant Attitudes

In justifying his forcible collectivization of the Soviet peasantry, Stalin relied on Lenin's claim that the advantages of socialism could be introduced into agriculture only through the establishment of large-scale farms capable of adopting the techniques of industry. Stalin ignored, however, a basic qualification in Lenin's view—that the success of such a system would depend upon its acceptance by the peasants as superior to their old way of life. Thus Lenin argued that "in countries where a small peasant economy prevails, the transition to socialism cannot be effected except by a series of gradual preliminary stages.[3] Stalin disdained such caution, and the price of his ruthless haste has been an agricultural system racked by difficulties and largely dependent upon coercion and force to keep it functioning.

There has been ample evidence over the years that the Soviet peasantry dislikes the collective system. Perhaps the most dramatic proof was afforded during

[1] Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan Co.), 1948, pp. 262-63.

[2] A. Tulupnikov in *Pravda,* October 4, 1955; and N. S. Khrushchev, "Report . . . to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU," *Pravda,* February 15, 1956.

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (in translation), Vol. VIII (New York: International Publishers), 1943, p. 158.

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World War II, when Ukrainian peasants hailed Hitler's invading army as liberators who would put an end to collectivization. They turned to guerrila warfare because of Nazi brutality—and, according to reports, only after the Nazis had decided to reinstate the collectives for their own benefit. The vast majority of peasants in other areas fought loyally for their homeland. According to escapees, however, throughout the country there were widespread rumors—not contradicted by the authorities—that at the war's end the collective system would be fundamentally revised. Everywhere peasants took advantage of relaxed controls to expand the size of their small private gardens at the expense of the collective fields. This practice was so universal that the regime, in its eventual postwar crack-down on the population, deemed it necessary to pass special legislation to recover the land, its decree of 1947 "Against Embezzlement of State and Public Property." Article IV of the decree clearly revealed the attitude of at least substantial portion of the peasantry, reading in part:

There is a large number of pretended collective farmers who either do not work at all in the collective farms or or do only sham work and spend most of their time on their own personal farming.[4]

While judgment of Soviet popular attitudes are hazardous at this distance, it seems reasonable to assume, then, that peasant feeling has not changed very much since 1919, when Lenin, commenting on resistance to the agricultural communes, wrote:

[Such peasants] . . . exclaim: "Long live the Soviet government but down with the commune! . . . These are not imaginary cases; they are taken from real life, from reports of comrades in the localities . . .[5]

If peasant resistance and indifference to the collective system has been a prime cause of Soviet agricultural failures, the Communist regime has compounded the problem many times over by its basic neglect of the agricultural sector. Since the early 1930's agriculture had been the orphan child of the Soviet economy, as a result of the priority assigned to heavy industrial development. For the resulting chronic lag in agricultural production and for the many administrative problems posed by collectivization, Stalin had only one solution: that was simply to increase and strengthen controls over the farms, largely through manipulations of the state-party bureaucracy. Both on economic and on political grounds, then, the agricultural system inherited by Stalin's successors was in dire need of reform by the time they took over in 1953.

Problems in Local Administration

The chief architect of the "reform" measures instituted since 1953 has been party boss Nikita Khrushchev himself. Even before Stalin's death Khrushchev was closely identified with agricultural plans and programs. Since that time agriculture has been his private preserve; indeed, during most of 1955, he apparently took personal charge of the agricultural ministry, and the post of Minister was left unfilled. Many argue that Khrushchev is so completely identified with the solution of the Soviet Union's serious agricultural problems that his political future will be determined by the success or failure of his schemes. Some of these have been bold in the extreme, if highly questionable—such as his grandiose projects for the cultivation of nearly 100 million acres of new (largely marginal) lands, and for the introduction of corn (a precarious crop in most of the USSR's growing areas) as a new source of animal feed.

In the area of administrative reforms, one of Khrushchev's major goals has been to pinpoint responsibility in the management of the collective farms. Although the advantages of one-man management have long been recognized in the Soviet Union and the adoption of such a system has been advocated for both industry and agriculture, little success has ever been achieved in this direction. In particular, the Stalinist system of overlapping control mechanisms had produced a situation wherein party and state *raion* (district) officials and the Machine and Tractor Station (M.T.S.) Directors and their staffs all had a hand in directing the collectives. Khrushchev clearly recognized the chaos in administration caused by such a system in his famous enumeration of the problems of agriculture in September of 1953.

It is necessary . . . to put an end to the state of affairs in which no one is specifically responsible for the guidance of the MTS and collective farms. The district party, soviet and agricultural organs have large staffs, working out at about five or six responsible officials to every collective farm. For all that, no one is actually responsible for how things are going on in the collective farms and MTS, or for political work among the masses.

It might be said that the secretaries of the district committees, the chairman of the district executive committees, the managers of the agricultural departments of the district executive committees, the directors of the MTS and many others are responsible for the collective farms and MTS. But who in a district is specifically responsible for this or that collective farm? Nobody will give you a definite answer to that question, because nobody is responsible for any specific farm. That is the fundamental

[4] Translated in James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System,* 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The George Wahr Publishing Co.), 1953, p. 404.

[5] Lenin, *op. cit.,* p. 178.

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defect in the guidance of the collective farms. In practice, the guidance of the collective farms is that some official of the district party or executive committee makes a tour of the collective farms in an automobile, covers half the district in one day, and not infrequently gives his instructions without even stepping out of his car.[6]

Khrushchev's Solution: Party Control

At the heart of this chaotic situation was, as Khrushchev's comments inferred, a confusion of authority between representatives and organs of the party *vis-à-vis* those of the state bureaucracy; this problem was compounded by the overlapping of responsibilities at the district, MTS and farm levels. Khrushchev's reorganization of the local administration aimed at both establishing a clear line of vertical responsibility and —far more crucial—centering final authority at each level in party hands.

Efforts to strengthen the party's hold over agriculture date back to 1950, when the regime carried out an extensive amalgamation of collective farms into larger units. Prior to this time, the collectives were so numerous (254,000) that any move to establish party units on each farm would have played havoc with the principle that the party must be maintained as a relatively small, closely-knit and highly-trained élite of Soviet rule. As a result of the amalgamations, the proportion of collectives boasting party units rose from 15 percent in 1949 to 80 percent by September 1953; a similar rise took place in the ratio of collectives whose chairmen were party members.[7] The effect, of course, was to unify the bottom level of party control and farm administration in a single pair of hands.

On up the line of command, however, the problem of dual authority between party and state officials remained. The source of confusion lay in the Stalinist system of controls in the parallel state and party hierarchies; under this system (which is still operative in industry), despite the actual power wielded by



—Not here, not here! The show place is further up . . .

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), August 30, 1956.*

party officials at any level, the direct line of administration supposedly rested in the hands of the government bureaucrat, with his party counterpart assigned the job of checking upon the administrator's execution of his duties. The inevitable result was divided authority, and consequently lack of accountability. Within the districts, the problem of administration was further complicated by the overlapping functions of *raion* organs (both party and state) and the state-owned and operated Machine Tractor stations.

Khrushchev's reorganization of 1953 amounted to a reversal of the Stalinist administrative scheme at the local level, vastly precipitating the trend toward party control. Specifically, it made the *raion* party Secretary responsible for the general supervision of all agricultural activity in his district. For each "M.T.S. zone" in the district, it established a party Secretary who is attached to the M.T.S. and who is directly responsible to the district party Secretary. Finally it gave each M.T.S. Secretary a staff of party "Instructors" (sometimes translated "Inspectors") who are individually responsible for a specific collective.[8]

In effect, then, the reorganization established a clear line of command and control from the higher echelons of the party down through the district apparatus to the farms themselves. On the operational level, it increased

[6] Khrushchev's speech of September 3, 1953, later published in translation as *Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), 1954.

[7] At present there are fewer than 90,000 collectives, averaging 5,000 acres and well over 1,000 members apiece. The statistics on party units were furnished by Khrushchev, *ibid.;* and Ya. Lovyouv and M. Gumerov, *Sotsialisticheskoe Selskoe Khoziaistvo* (Socialist Agriculture), Moscow, December 1950, pp. 32-41.

Although the country-wide percentage of collectives with party chairmen has not been made public, *Pravda* of December 14, 1950, revealed that the Ukraine percentage had increased to 83 percent as of that date. Recently, as further discussion will show, 20,000 party members have been recruited to serve as *kolkhoz* chairmen.

[8] In Khrushchev's words, the party Instructor is a "specific official" who ". . . has charge of a specific collective farm and is responsible for it, so that there is somebody who can be held answerable for the proper placing of forces, for political work among the collective farmers, and for the performance of the tasks confronting the given collective farm." Speech of September 3, 1953, *loc. cit.*

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the role of the M.T.S. to make it the focus of real power, as a discussion of further "reforms" will show. The elementary principles of public administration would dictate that the M.T.S. party Secretaries were intended to replace the state-appointed M.T.S. Directors as the key figures on the local scene, and references in the Soviet press to the operation of the new system confirm that such a trend has developed. Similarly there is evidence that the party Instructors were intended to supplant the *kolkhoz* chairmen as the real administrative heads of individual farms, even while there has been continued emphasis on getting party people into the chairmen slots. Indeed, the major official criticism of the new system has been that the M.T.S. party officials and their staffs have not taken their responsibilities seriously enough. In a speech of March 1955 Khrushchev complained of the tendency of some M.T.S. party Secretaries to be satisfied with merely "issuing instructions" of a general nature, adding, "It is time to realize that the collective farm managerial personnel need not general instructions but practical help and helpful advice." [9]

The Problem of "Expertise"

To enable the party to carry out its new role in agriculture the Soviet leadership launched a recruitment drive to fill the M.T.S. and district party posts and to complete the job of providing each collective with a party chairman. Originally a call was given for "30,000 volunteers . . . both Communists and non-party people, who are capable of managing collective farms."[10] Apparently only party "volunteers" were accepted, however, for in recording the modest success of the campaign at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev reported: "More than 20,000 Communists have been sent from the cities to the countryside and recommended for posts as collective farm chairmen"[11]; no explanation was offered for the shortage of almost 10,000 recruits. The Soviet press has not revealed the count of additional party members detailed to the M.T.S. and district offices, but at least several thousand must have joined the expanded agricultural bureaucracy in these capacities.

In Khrushchev's terms the vastly increased strength of the party in agriculture has established a new level of responsibility. The price of this achievement may come very high, however, as political reliability is hardly a substitute for technical competence. Certainly a large percentage, perhaps a majority, of the people in the new key positions of local leadership are city people unacquainted with agricultural work. Many new problems can be expected to arise in the area of collective farm administration unless the M.T.S. party Inspector (or, for that matter, the urban party member who has been transformed into a *kolkhoz* chairman) is ready to defer to the judgment of subordinates who are trained agriculturists. Certainly this will be the case until the new agricultural leadership acquires a practical education in the management of agriculture. However, if the past impatience of the dictatorship with its rural leadership is any guide (the turnover of local leaders has always been rapid), the necessary mistakes that must be made in the process of learning may well result in further upheavals in the ranks of agricultural administrative staffs. That Soviet officialdom is not totally unaware of this dilemma has been indicated in *Pravda:*

> We cannot consider the approach some local organizations have to collective farm personnel—the frequent changing of collective farm chairmen—to be correct. Instead of helping a new collective farm director to organize matters correctly, some party, Soviet and agricultural agencies prefer to raise the question of replacing him by someone else the minute any difficulty arises.[12]

The Soviet leadership has indicated its firm intention to stick to the new system of party administration, whatever its drawbacks. This determination was voiced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, allegedly in answer to criticisms that the new system had "not yielded great results everywhere" and that further reorganization was necessary.

> Some comrades say that it is necessary to change the structure of district party committees again. A little thought must be given to this. It seems to us hardly expedient to carry out a fresh reorganization. It is better to follow the path of strengthening the cadres, selecting good organizers capable of work among people, to be district party committee secretaries, wherever necessary. *We should follow the line of bringing party leadership closer to production, so as to put a complete end to lack of personal responsibility in party work.*[13]

Work Reforms—and "Work-day" Norms

The crucial aim and effect of the 1953 reorganization, then, was at long last to establish party strength and control in rural Russia. The decentralization of agricultural administration and decision-making, to the extent that it has been allowed, has been wholly contingent upon the achievement of this aim—that is, upon the preservation and extension of a hierarchichal line of command down through the party apparatus, to ensure control when necessary. Only with this basic conception

[9] Published in *Pravda,* March 31, 1955, p. 1.

[10] *Pravda,* April 5, 1955, p. 1.

[11] Khrushchev speech published in *Pravda,* February 15, 1956.

[12] M. Annenko and S. Teyshkin, *Pravda.* January 11, 1956, p. 2.

[13] *Pravda,* February 15, 1956. Author's italics.

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can the impact of subsequent "reform" measures in agriculture be seen in the proper light.

First to be mentioned among these are a number of personnel changes aimed at introducing greater rationality into the post-1953 system and at improving the technical competence of work. In 1953 more than a million *kolkhozniki* (the working members of the collectives) were placed upon the permanent M.T.S. payrolls; these were the peasants who operated the M.T.S. farm machinery but who had been only seasonally employed by the M.T.S.[14] Conversely, in 1955 the agronomists responsible for serving the collectives and stationed in the M.T.S. were transferred from the M.T.S. payrolls to the accounts of the individual collectives which they serve.[15] Perhaps most important, a recruitment campaign—complementing the drive to attract new party members—has resulted in the addition of 120,000 agricultural specialists and 29,000 engineers and technicians to the staffs of the M.T.S. and the farms.[16]

The first major measure directly identified as a move toward agricultural decentralization involved the determination of "work-day" norms—that is, the time (or more correctly, the amount of labor [17]) the peasants are supposed to devote to the collectives. In the past these compulsory norms were established by the central bureaucracy, with some variation allowed on the basis of regional differences. The reform, announced in 1954, alleged to transfer this function to the farms; in effect, however, it was little more than a device to increase existing norms, relying for their enforcement on the strengthened party apparatus. Specific terms of the measure were revealed in the newspaper *Selskoe khoziaistvo* (Agriculture) on August 31, 1954:

A new system has now been instituted, whereby the obligatory minimum of work-days for able-bodied collective farmers for the year as a whole and for the various seasons . . . is established by a general meeting of the collective farmers in light of the specific conditions on the individual collective farm.

Up to this point the "new system" sounded indeed like a genuine effort toward decentralization. Almost immediately, however, the article went on to state that revisions of the norms "must" result in a "new minimum . . . higher than the minimum for the preceding year." At best, then, the collective farmers could "vote" to let the old, centrally-established norms stand; but their decision could become effective only "upon confirmation by the district Soviet executive committee." The clear implication was that increases were expected, and that any farm (thus the responsible M.T.S. party Inspector and Secretary) which failed to raise the "work-day" norms would have to explain to higher authority.

In his address to the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev reported that during the Fifth Five-Year Plan the average number of "work-days" put in by the peasants had increased by 30 percent.[18] Press claims that this increase is proof of the peasants' growing enthusiasm toward the collectives are robbed of conviction by the fact that violations of the work-day norms were legion before the strengthening of political controls over the countryside. The latter provide a far more logical explanation for the increase.

"Decentralized" Planning

The most important move toward "decentralization" came in January 1955 when Khrushchev announced the abandonment of the old system of agricultural planning, under which each area had received a centrally-devised sowing and animal husbandry plan based on types of crops and livestock raised. These plans, in Khrushchev's words, had been devised ". . . without any consideration for soil or climatic conditions" and failed to "foster initiative and creativity among M.T.S. workers, agricultural specialists, collective farm officials and collective farmers." [19] Here, it seemed, was an open admission that genuine decentralization was needed; again, however, an examination of the explicit and implicit limitations on the new system reveals something far less spectacular than Khrushchev's remarks implied.

The three major points of the new planning system, as outlined in the decree which legalized Khrushchev's proposals, are as follows: 1) production plans are to be drawn up by the collective farms themselves "with the participation of the M.T.S."; 2) the collectives are still to receive "assignments [planned quotas] for delivery" of that portion of their produce destined for state purchases; 3) before becoming effective, all plans must be reviewed carefully and approved by the district executive committees, whose responsibility is to determine that all assignments for state purchase will be met; if not, their duty is to "instruct the collective farm to make necessary changes in the plan." [20]

[14] Khrushchev announced this action in a speech of February 23, 1954; published in *Pravda,* March 21, 1954, pp. 1-15.

[15] Revealed in *Selskoe Khoziaistvo* August 31, 1955.

[16] This campaign was originally announced by *Pravda* of September 19, 1953; the results are cited from Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, *loc. cit.*

[17] The *trudoden,* or "work-day," though originally an index of time, is today a unit of measure in a highly complex piecework system, by which the individual peasant's share in the collective product is determined.

[18] *Loc. cit.*

[19] Speech published in *Pravda,* February 3, 1955, pp. 1-5.

[20] Joint decree of the CC of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of March 9, 1955; in *Pravda,* March 11, p. 1.

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These provisions would seem to indicate that central planning of production had indeed been delegated to the rural administration. The key to understanding the operation of the new system lies, however, in two crucial functions which the central bureaucracy has retained. In the first place the state, as *Pravda* among other sources has put it, still "plans centrally . . . the amounts of basic agricultural products necessary for supplying the cities and industrial centers, for building up reserves and for export requirements." [21] Obviously the total state requirement, as determined at the center, will continue to be a crucial control over the planning of the major share of farm output. In the second place, the central bureaucracy still predetermines the amount of machine and tractor work the M.T.S. are to perform on the collective fields.[22]

The enactment of the new planning system was accompanied by the transfer of the procurement function from the Ministry of Procurements to the Ministry of Agriculture; as a practical result, the procurement task at the local level has fallen to the M.T.S. This responsibility makes it imperative that the M.T.S. control planning of at least the state's share of production (subject, of course, to supervision by the district authorities); and it is clear that their role in planning will in turn be restricted by the state blueprint governing their machine work on the farms.

The inseparability of planning and procurement was clearly implied by Khrushchev in discussing the M.T.S.' new function in his January 1955 speech:

> **In agriculture the M.T.S. must be our stronghold. The main creators of goods in agriculture are the M.T.S. collective and state farms.**
>
> **Hence the conclusion: Now that the M.T.S. decide the outcome of production of the main agricultural products, they are able also to take upon themselves responsibility for conducting procurements on collective farms. The director and all the workers of the M.T.S. are under obligation to organize their work in such a way as to create the conditions, in the very process of production, for the fulfillment of the procurements plan.[23]**

Given the M.T.S. monopoly over the farm machinery and the 1953 delegation of full "responsibility" to the M.T.S. party Secretary for the collectives' work, the additional responsibility for procurement has completed the nearly absolute hegemony of the M.T.S. over the collectives. Insofar as the first provision of the new planning decree (as cited above) is concerned, it is obvious

Caption, upper left: **In every *kolkhoz* of ours there are several officials for the procurement of this or that kind of produce. Are they necessary? No, they are not necessary (from the address of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev).**
***Caption, upper right:*—Let's get going! There is no room to load anything else.**

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), February 29, 1956.*

that "participation" of the M.T.S. in drawing up the collectives' production plans means in effect direct supervision if not performance of this function.

Similarly, the responsibility of district authorities to see that the centrally-assigned state quotas are met (as outlined in the third provision of the decree) makes it incumbent upon them to oversee and coordinate the further division of quotas among the collectives (as demanded in the second provision); certainly, then, they must exercise their prerogative of control over the individual farm plans.

Since the central procurement plan affects only the state share of planned production, the possibility remains that the collectives will be allowed some freedom in planning the balance of their output. This is hard to credit, however, in view of Khrushchev's emphasis on the M.T.S. "stronghold" and the fact that district authorities now more than before have been charged with the close supervision of *all* agricultural activity.

The Ties That Bind

The two most recent moves undertaken in the name of "decentralization" have also aimed at strengthening controls in the local administrative system. The first is a proposal, as yet unimplemented, to develop a system for

[21] A. Tulupnikov in *Pravda,* October 4, 1955.

[22] In Khrushchev's words, "The state plan shall [still] set assignments for the M.T.S. . . . in terms of the total volume of tractor work, in conversion of plowing equivalents." (Khrushchev's speech in *Pravda,* February 3, 1955).

[23] *Ibid.*

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placing the M.T.S. on a "cost-accounting" (*i.e.*, self-supporting) basis during 1957, a move obviously designed in part to induce them to tighten their ties to (and controls over) the collectives.[24] Published comment indicates that a rational solution to the complex problems involved in this move has not yet been found; however, one of the suggestions repeatedly stressed has been to link the level of income of M.T.S. officials to the output of farms for which they are responsible.

The second and more important move is a thinly-disguised renewal of the assault on the peasants' private plots. On March 10, 1956, a joint party-state decree declared that, since the collectives have "risen to a new stage of development" in recent years, the Model Charter (the so-called "Basic Law" of collective administration, enacted in 1935) often serves to "restrict" the initiative necessary to meet specific conditions on individual farms. Henceforth, the collectives are to be free to amend the Charter in light of local needs. Here again, however, neither the power nor the authority rests in the hands of the collectives, as no amendment is effective until registered with the district Executive Committee.

The crucial section of the decree is contained, as usual, in the rider which follows. Assertedly, the enforcement of "work-day" minimums is now more important than ever and therefore a new penalty is provided. The essence of this new provision is that *the size of the private plot is to be reduced* (or even eliminated altogether) to the degree that a peasant household has failed to fulfil its "work-day" minimums.

The sting of the "stick" is perhaps softened by a concomitant innovation in the payments system on the farms. In general, prior to this time the peasant was required to wait until the end of the fiscal year before receiving his share of the collective's cash income. Now, however, collectives are instructed to provide the peasants with substantial monthly advance payments for their work, a move undoubtedly aimed at enhancing the importance of the peasant's income from the collective over that from his private plot.[25]

The Dilemma of Power

To complete the circle of discussion, the import of Khrushchev's agricultural program must be measured in terms of its impact on the individual peasant. The participation of an individual in any organization, political or economic, can be traced in general to motivations emanating from three roots: material interest; force (the coercive motivation of fear); or the degree of authority held by the organization and its leadership (the term authority, as used here, means those factors which taken together produce in the individual mind the attitude that the institution is entitled to obedience, credit and acceptance). In the open societies of the West the element of force is present only to a minimal degree, and therefore some combination of economic incentive and the authority of the organization guide the individual's actions. In the Soviet Union, however, all authority is reserved for the party, to which only a small elite segment of society may belong. Past history indicates that the peasants' acceptance of this authority is small indeed. Thus, as the present analysis of the contemporary scene would bear out, the motivation of the peasantry as members of the collectives is restricted very largely to a combination of the elements of coercion and material interest. The first of these would seem to be the dominant factor; for while the post-Stalin regime has taken some steps toward increasing economic incentives, rejecting the Stalinist attitude that these were generally too costly for agriculture, improvements in the peasants' economic welfare have been insignificant and hardly have wrought any fundamental changes in the system.

On the political side of the ledger, the forces at work in the Soviet system have induced the central leadership to increase its control over agriculture while attempting to gain the advantages of decentralization. The present analysis has not meant to imply that the expressed need for decentralization was merely a hypocritical disguise for dark deeds; its intention has rather been to show the blindness of the Soviet Communists to the nature of the Leviathan they have created. With all of their power they cannot cause it to be turned inside out.

Even the Western democracies have found that the pull of the tide dooms to defeat most attempts to achieve decentralization. In a totalitarian dictatorship the problems involved are compounded many times. What the Soviet dictatorship has failed to recognize is that the ability to make decisions at any level always rests on the degree of power held by the individual or office involved. Any effective move toward decentralizing the decision-making process is inexorably dependent upon an equal devolution of power. As the noted German sociologist Max Weber concluded in his pioneering study of bureaucracy, where bureaucratization has been carried through completely, a top-to-bottom *"form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable."* [26] Applied to the Soviet Union, this observation becomes another way of stating the analysis of power quoted at the outset of this paper; certainly in the area of agriculture, the Soviet leadership has not yet found an answer to the dilemma of control *vs.* de-control.

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[24] V. Dolzhnyk in *Kommunist,* March 1956, pp. 1-3.

[25] *Pravda,* March 10, 1956, p. 1.; and V. Dolzhnyk, *ibid.*

[26] *Essays on Sociology,* translated by Gerth and Mills (New York: Oxford University Press), 1946, p. 228.

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Press Regulation in Mao's China

By Yuan-li Wu

The newspaper is the most powerful weapon that can be used to educate the population in socialist thought, to propagandize the Communist Party's plans and policies, and to tighten the close relationship between the party and the masses.

—*Jen-min jih-pao,* Peiping, April 26, 1956.

IN THESE WORDS the highest official newspaper organ of the Chinese Communist regime succinctly sums up the essential role of the press in Mao's "People's Republic." Obviously, there is nothing either new or surprising in this formulation, for it hews to the standard Communist concept of the press, not as a free, independent medium of information and opinion, but as "collective propagandist and . . . agitator" as well as "collective organizer."[1] The critical importance which the Chinese Communist leadership attributes to this weapon of mass political indoctrination and control is abundantly clear from the assiduous effort with which it has sought to expand the party-controlled press, and from the comprehensive character of the press apparatus which it has succeeded in developing in six years of Comunist rule.

Although, prior to the Communist conquest of governmental power, there had been a succession of party newspaper organs dating as far back as 1924, the development of the powerful press apparatus which the party commands today began only with the final military offensive which extended Communist control over the whole of the Chinese mainland.[2] In 1948, as the offensive got underway, *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily) was established, in more or less its present form, as the supreme organ of the CPC Central Committee, and its circulation steadily increased as it followed the troops into the areas captured from Nationalist authority. At the same time the Communists set up new local party organs in these areas and began the systematic take-over of existing press organizations.

Nationalist organs, both official and semi-official, were naturally the first victims of suppression. As a Communist account puts it, "newspapers and periodicals formerly belonging to the Kuomintang were closed without exception, while genuine people's publications were given all conditions for free development."[3] Such newspapers as the Kuomintang-controlled *Chung-yang jih-pao* (Central Daily News) were thus seized outright, and at the same time private, independent newspapers were subjected to both overt and subtle, undercover pressures calculated to force their closure or reorganization under Communist control. The reputable Catholic daily *Yi shih-pao* (Social Welfare), for example, was compelled to cease publication. *Hsin-wen pao,* important Shanghai journal, underwent "reorganization", and the widely-read independent Tientsin newspaper, *Ta-kung pao,* also was brought under the thumb of the party in 1949 with the conversion of its editor to Communist allegiance.[4]

The combined processes of eliminating independent

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Where to Begin," (May 1901), *Selected Works,* International Publishing House, New York, Vol. II, p. 21.

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[2] The earlier newspaper organs of the party were: *Hsiang-tao* (Guide), 1924-27: *Fen-tou* (Struggle), 1927-36: *Hsin-hua jih-pao* (New China Daily) and *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (Liberation Daily), 1936-45. They had only limited circulation and, at times, were little more than clandestine sheets.

[3] Liao Kai-lung, "Newspapers and Magazines in the People's Republic of China," *Hsin-hua yueh-pao* (New China Monthly), Peiping, No. 6 (June), 1955, pp. 191-93.

[4] Wang Yun-sheng, then editor of *Ta-kung pao,* openly declared for the Communist cause. Cf. Jen Chung, "The Communists and the Press," *Tsu-kuo chou-k'an* (China Weekly), Hongkong, No. 65 (March 1954), p. 9.

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competition and expanding the organs speaking directly for the party have resulted in a monolithic press structure thoroughly subservient to the party's will. The structure is composed of a small number of key newspapers which are circulated nationally, and a much larger number of papers serving only the localities where they are published. Excluding small county papers, the total number reached 265 in 1955.[5]

There is a natural differentiation in subject matter between the national and local newspapers, the former concentrating on affairs at the national level while the latter devote greater attention to matters of particular interest or concern to their own areas of circulation. In addition to this geographic specialization, there is a differentiation along functional lines which is particularly noteworthy among the organs of national circulation.

The Tools and the Target

As the mouthpiece of the Central Committee, for example, *Jen-min jih-pao* specializes in party affairs and, like the Soviet *Pravda,* serves as the official expositor and interpreter of the current party line in all matters. Its columns therefore constitute virtually compulsory reading material for all party cadres and at the same time furnish the entire press with the general policy guidelines which it must follow. This vital function places the newspaper, figuratively speaking, at the apex of the pyramid-like press structure.

The other subsidiary organs of national circulation are functionally designed to carry the party's propaganda to different key segments of the population. *Kung-jen jih-pao* (Workers' Daily), organ of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, has the task of indoctrinating the workers with the philosophy of "socialist construction"; *Wen-hui pao* is aimed chiefly at primary and high school teachers; and *Kuang-ming jih-pao,* officially identified as the organ of the "democratic coalition" parties collaborating with the Communists, speaks especially to the intelligentsia, stressing cultural and educational matters. *Ta-kung pao,* though now throughly integrated into the party propaganda machine, retains at least a trace of its old identity in that it continues to stress economic and foreign affairs.

Along with the multiplication of the number of party organs, both national and local, and the reorganization of the press structure along hierarchic and functional lines, unceasing efforts have been made by the Chinese Communist regime to expand newspaper circulation. The party leadership is keenly aware that this is vital to propaganda effectiveness and has therefore made it a primary goal not only to get the party organs read by the greatest possible number of people, but to ensure that a maximum proportion of readers be reached by more than one newspaper simultaneously. This, in large part, explains why the local Communist papers are encouraged to give major emphasis to matters of local interest and why some of the already established papers, such as *Ta-kung pao,* have been permitted to retain their old names (in an effort to hold on to their past subscribers). It also is one of the considerations underlying the policy of functional specialization, which is supposed to be conducive to better quality and greater attunement of the newspapers to the interests of the various occupational groups.

Perhaps the most effective step taken by the regime to expand readership has been the assignment of entire responsibility for newspaper circulation to the postal service. Utilization of the posts for this purpose was instituted on a national scale shortly after the holding of the First National Postal Conference and Convention of Newspaper Managers in December 1949, which led to the wholesale transfer of experienced personnel from the newspaper circulation departments over to the postal service.[6] The mail carriers not only deliver the newspapers but also solicit subscriptions, collect payments, secure renewals, and actively organize newspaper reading groups designed both to stimulate study of the daily press and to ensure that single copies of the papers reach maximum numbers of people.[7]

For a country with a population of 600,000,000, newspaper circulation figures in Communist China remain strikingly low, but statistics made public by the regime indicate that there has at least been a substantial advance in recent years. According to the official figures, total circulation had risen to 12,000,000 at the end of 1955, as compared with 7,000,000 in

[5] These comprised 17 national newspapers, 31 regional, 11 locals circulating in major cities (Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai), 48 locals in other cities; 15 provincials for peasant readers; 20 language papers in Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, Kazakh, Si, Yi, and Korean; and 123 other provincial and township papers. Liao, *op. cit.;* also *Jen-min jih-pao,* Peiping, January 13, 1956.

[6] Chu Hsueh-fan, "Chinese Post Office Spreads Knowledge," *China Reconstructs,* Peiping, No. 2 (March-April 1952), pp. 9-11.

[7] According to Chu, over 23,000 such groups, with 320,000 peasant participants, had been organized in Shensi province by 1952. There were 904 similar groups in Shanghai, and in Peiping every block had its own group. It should be noted that the groups serve another purpose in enabling the party cadres to check directly on popular reactions to the party line.

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1952.[8] Since some papers which are not dailies are included, total circulation of the daily press is somewhat less, but also would appear to be growing at a comparable pace judging from the official claim that *Jen-min jih-pao* increased its circulation from 500,000 in June of 1954 to 710,000 by the end of 1955.[9] The regime's recognition that it still has a long way to go despite these increases was implicit in *Jen-min jih-pao's* declaration, on April 26, 1956, that "to increase the circulation of the party's paper must be regarded as a political assignment."

Centralized party control is, of course, a fundamental characteristic of the Chinese Communist press. Supreme authority resides in the Propaganda Department of the party Central Committee, which decides propaganda themes, occasionally issues official releases of its own for dissemination through the press, and originates orders and directives relative to information policy and other matters affecting press operations. Its decisions and directives are transmitted through both party and government channels.

Two vital cogs in the machinery of party control are the New China News Agency (NCNA) and *Jen-min jih-pao.* Through NCNA, the party exercises a complete monopoly over the news to be made available to the press for publication, and use of the agency's dispatches has been compulsory for all newspapers since January 1950.[10] *Jen-min jih-pao,* as stated earlier, acts as the official enunciator of the party line for the whole press to echo; and, in addition, it exercises close surveillance of all the newspapers, occasionally publishing direct or indirect criticisms of offending journals in a section entitled "Survey and Comments of the Press," which appears periodically.

The Effects of Regimentation

The most telling evidence of the party's ubiquitous control is furnished by the drab, regimented uniformity of the newspapers. By way of illustration, let us take three of the leading national dailies—*Jen-min jih-pao, Kuang-ming jih-pao and Ta-Kung pao.* Until the expansion of *Jen-min jih-pao* to eight pages in July 1956, all three had published regular daily editions of four pages, in addition to which they put out

[8] *Jen-min jih-pao,* April 26, 1956; Yu Chi-tung, "Three Years of Cultural and Educational Work in the New China," *People's China,* Peiping, No. 18 (September), 1952, pp. 33-4.

[9] *Jen-min jih-pao,* April 26, 1956. According to Liao, *op. cit.,* 1955 circulations of the other major papers were: *Wen-hui pao,* 180,000; *Kung-jen jih-pao,* 150,000; *Ta-kung pao,* 110,000; and *Kuang-ming jih-pao,* 70,000.

[10] *Jen-min jih-pao,* January 12, 1950.



A COMMENT

This cartoon shows an editor rejecting a report of falling production, submitted by an "investigator." The editor's comment: "Contrary to fact; publication denied!"

—From *Hsin Kuan Cha* (Peiping), January 1, 1957.

special pictorial and other types of supplements at less frequent intervals. Selecting at random the date of January 3, 1954, a comparison of the contents of the three papers reveals the following:

The two items given top prominence on the front page of *Jen-min jih-pao* on this date were (1) the replies given by the then Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov to questions put to him by the American news agency, International News Service; and (2) a *Pravda* editorial of the preceding day calling for a "further relaxation of the tense international situation." The same two items were likewise given major front-page play in the other two papers, under identical headlines.

Turning to the second page, the feature article in *Jen-min jih-pao* carried the self-congratulatory title, "Agricultural Production Increased Through Propagation of the General Line." (The "general line" is the official designation of the revised party line promulgated in 1953 for the period of "transition to socialism.") Obviously, the prescribed theme for the day was the virtues of the "general line," for the other two papers expatiated on it from the angles of their own respective specializations. *Kuang-ming jih-pao's* second-page feature was entitled, "The General Line Illuminates our Forward March to Socialism," other items on the same page dealing with educational activities in relation to the

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line. *Ta-kung pao* devoted its corresponding space to reports on production, grain deliveries, and market control—all, again, viewed as practical examples of the working of the "general line" in the economic sphere.

Third-page items showed a greater degree of variation among the three papers, though the underlying party slant remained uniform. *Jen-min jih-pao* carried several items dealing with preparations for "basic level" elections, "counterrevolutionary" activities, and party news, as well as some excerpts from *Pravda* and short cultural items. *Kuang-ming jih-pao* offered reports on the activities of literary circles in connection with the "general line", some book reviews, and some items concerning agricultural cooperatives. *Ta-kung pao* dealt principally with developments in the reorganization of private business enterprises to admit government participation, giving its report the enthusiastic headline, "As the Happy Day Approaches." A slight amount of space was devoted to price and other quotations, advertisements and public notices.

The fourth page of the three newspapers, the standard place for "international news" coverage, was devoted almost exclusively to items dealing with or emanating from the Soviet orbit and foreign Communist groups, generally the same items in all three papers. In addition to these, *Jen-min jih-pao* offered some biographical material concerning Stalin Prize winners; and *Ta-kung pao* ran a story alleging "American exploitation of Germany."

This sampling is fairly typical of the day-to-day content and tone of the Chinese Communist press. The front pages of the newspapers, habitually devoted to the items rated most important by the party, are naturally the most uniform; the last pages, purveying "international news", only slightly less so. Such diversity as exists is limited primarily to the inside pages, to filler material, supplements, and editorials of less than front-page importance. Variations in subject matter, however, mean no variation in the slanting of all newspaper content to achieve the party's propaganda objectives.

The Tasks of the Press

Since the essential function of the Communist press is to indoctrinate rather than inform, its content necessarily mirrors the ideas which the party leadership wishes to instill in the public mind. For one thing, there is constant indoctrination in the basic ideology of communism. *Jen-min-jih-pao,* for instance, has published in its columns the complete texts of Stalin's *Marxism and Linguistics* and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* as well as the theoretical works of Mao Tse-tung, such as *On People's Democratic Dictatorship, On Contradiction,* and *On Practice.*

The "solidarity" of the Communist bloc of nations in opposition to the "encirclement" attempts of the "capitalist enemy" is another basic ideological theme. The "international news" sections of all the newspapers uniformly concentrate on reporting Soviet and satellite developments, injecting only selected items about Western countries, purposely slanted to serve Communist propaganda objectives. The technique of quoting favorable comments on Communist China by sympathetic foreign sources is frequently used to foster the impression of growing world approbation.

Apart from these basic constants, the propaganda role of the press also involves aiding in the application of current party policies. The newspapers must let the public, and especially the party cadres, know what the regime expects of them at the moment, a task which it fulfills in part by publishing the texts, often complete, of government regulations and directives, in part by launching concerted propaganda campaigns keyed to certain themes.

These campaigns, generally centering around some catching slogan, give rise to the endless mass "movements" which have become characteristic of the Chinese Communist scene: the "land reform" and "thought reform" movements of 1949-51; the "3-anti" and "5-anti" drives of 1952; the sustained "resist-America, aid-Korea" campaign; the recurrent drives for austerity and increased production; and the 1956 drive to induce more intellectuals to join the party. Once a theme has been decided by the party, it is uniformly publicized on the front pages of the newspapers as a "major event" and is systematically followed up. It is also expatiated upon *ad nauseam* in the inside pages of every paper from the particular angle of its specialization, and sometimes in special supplements. It supplies the cementing influence which binds the press together in the desired pattern of uniformity.

Because of the primacy of its indoctrinational role, the content of the Chinese Communist press is governed much more by the prevailing propaganda themes than by the normal Western considerations of news timeliness. Indeed, the currency, as news, of what appears in the newspapers is only incidental. Thus, for instance, the decision to collectivize agriculture was adopted by the Chinese party leadership more than a year before the press began publicizing it in February 1953.[11]

[11] See the author's *An Economic Survey of Communist China,* Bookman Associates, New York, 1956, chapter on land reform.

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Such delays may sometimes be occasioned by the party's need for time to work out the details of a propaganda theme. On the other hand, where the theme has already been operative for some time, new developments may be promptly reported. Thus, the draft agricultural development plan for 1956-57, which called for stepping up the pace of collectivization, was taken under consideration by the Central Political Bureau of the party on January 23, 1956, and reported in *Jen-min jih-pao* on January 26. The crux of the matter of timing is, perhaps, most aptly and frankly explained in this passage from *Jen-min jih-pao* (July 20, 1954):

> Timeliness is a basic element of news. . . . But the proper time for public release must be selected in reporting on important meetings and problems so as to facilitate the work at hand. Immediate release cannot be required in such cases.

Brake Upon Editorial Initiative

Since propaganda themes must always be attuned to the official party line regardless of twists and turns, the prescribed theme today may not be the same as that which the party will prescribe on the same subject six months, weeks, or even days hence—indeed, the two may conceivably be quite inconsistent. This obviously makes it important that there be a single voice which speaks with final authority in laying down a propaganda theme and in interpreting important events, particularly those connected with political decisions and party affairs. *Jen-min jih-pao,* as we have seen, occupies this position, acting as bellwether for the whole Chinese Communist press.

The system has, as one of its effects, sharply curtailed the editorial initiative of the subordinate party organs. As a general rule, all major editorials which appear in *Jen-min jih-pao* are carried verbatim in the other papers, which seldom dare publish editorials of their own on political matters. *Jen-min jih-pao* editorials on topics of lesser importance or of a specialized nature need not be reprinted in the other papers unless they fall within the field of specialization of a particular paper, which probably then will carry it; but even when not constrained to echo the words of the party oracle, the subordinate journals show a marked hesitancy to editorialize on their own.

A few statistics will serve to illustrate this point. A survey of *Kuang-ming jih-pao* over a 168-day period during the first half of 1954 reveals that the paper republished 19 editorials from *Jen-min jih-pao* and seven from *Pravda;* and, of the remaining 142 days, it printed editorials of its own on only 31 days and carried none at all on 111. (The paper's reticence is particularly striking because this was the period during which the Chinese Communist constitution was in preparation. Were the paper a genuine organ of the minority "democratic parties", it might have been expected to take an active part in the discussion of the constitution in its editorial columns.) *Ta-kung pao's* record over a 176-day period was somewhat less extreme, but still indicative of the loss of its once noted editorial vigor and independence: it reprinted 23 *Jen-min jih-pao* and 8 *Pravda* editorials, carried 75 of its own, and published none on 70 days.

While it appears that, more recently, the subordinate national newspapers have been publishing editorials of their own with greater frequency, they still are leaving the field of political comment almost entirely to *Jen-min jih-pao* and closely following the prescribed party line in their editorials dealing with other matters. During September 1956, for instance, *Kuang-ming jih-pao* published only one editorial bearing on domestic politics, and this was characteristically entitled, "Unity and Progress, One and All, under the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party."[12]

Manufacturing an Illusion

The pursuit of a propaganda theme, however, cannot be considered wholly successful unless the regime manages to create at least an illusion of spontaneous popular approval. Mere passive acceptance is not enough, for the Chinese Communist Party is anxious to show both the country and the world at large that its leadership and policies are heartily applauded and supported by masses of citizens. Such "popular backing" then becomes a convenient justification for further official action "by popular demand."

The press plays its part in this great stage show by various devices. One is to fill the pages of the newspapers with reports of "spontaneous" mass meetings, group pledges, and statements by individual citizens serving to reinforce a certain propaganda theme. For this purpose the newspapers utilize a vast army of part-time correspondents in all walks of life and so dispersed as to give an appearance of broad geographical coverage. According to an authoritative Communist source, *Jen-min jih-pao* has regular contact with 10,000 such correspondents.[13] Even the provincial papers use large numbers of them judging from the 1950 report that

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[12] Of the other editorials published during the month, nine dealt with education, eight with "international" topics, and three with relief work.

[13] Hsiao Ping, "The People's Daily", *People's China,* No. 2 (January), 1954, pp. 12-16.

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". . . AS LONG AS IT IS PUBLISHED"

Writer, addressing editor: You are at liberty to change the rest of the article, but please don't change my signature.

—From *Hsin Kuan Cha* (Peiping), January 1, 1957.

the *Hopei Daily* had 1,600, the *North Kiangsu Daily*, more than 1,200, and the *Shanghai Labor Daily* 7,000.[14]

The publication of "readers' letters" is another device frequently used to demonstrate popular approval, as well as to give added publicity to a current propaganda theme. Typical examples are letters published in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (August 9, 1954) eulogizing the newly-adopted Chinese Communist constitution (then the major proganda theme); a letter from a student in the same newspaper (September 8, 1954) advocating the "liberation" of Formosa; and a letter from a model soldier of the "People's Army", published in *Jen-min jih-pao*, expressing determination to be "a good revolutionary soldier."[15]

To be sure, the correspondence columns also print occasional letters of a critical nature. The party, indeed, makes much of the role of criticism as a safeguard against complacency, inefficiency, and the alienation of the party from the "masses." A resolution of the Central Committee in April 1950 exhorted all party members to "adopt a genuinely revolutionary attitude by welcoming and supporting criticism," and the old Information Administration not only sanctioned the publication of "constructive criticisms" but directed the newspapers to "make it their responsibility to secure replies to all the criticisms published and to undertake to publish these replies so that the full facts are put before the public."[16]

All this sounds highly democratic and commendable, as indeed the party means it to sound in order to support its claims of "inner-party democracy." Careful examination of the actual criticisms aired in the correspondence columns of the press, however, indicates that they are generally directed at cases of waste, inefficiency or, perhaps, corruption in local government agencies—public health organs, supply depots, etc.—and occasionally in the lower strata of the party bureaucracy. On the other hand, though individual party officials may be assailed for faulty execution of party policy, neither the policy itself nor the party may be criticized. As one Communist spokesman puts it, the press cannot be permitted to publish such criticisms as would undermine "the interests of the state and the people"—these interests, of course, being construed as equivalent to those of the party.[17]

The innocuous nature of the letters that find their way into print certainly suggests very careful screening, if not, in some cases, actual planting by the party. Their publication and follow-up serves a propaganda purpose in fostering a popular impression of party tolerance and responsiveness to public opinion. At the same time, to the extent that the letters received by the newspapers are genuine, spontaneous expressions of the writers' opinions, they furnish the party with a useful channel for keeping informed of grass-roots sentiment and conditions.

A Chinese Communist "Thaw"?

In the last year or so, there has been much speculation concerning the extent to which the Chinese Communist regime is following Moscow's earlier lead in the direction of some measure of relaxation of thought control and of the rigid limitations upon the freedom of the press. One of the much-propagandized slogans of 1956 was Mao's pronouncement (in May) of a new policy toward intellectuals, summed up in the exhortation, "Let flowers of many kinds blossom, and diverse schools of thought contend." *Jen-min jih-pao* also stated, in its July 1 issue, that it planned to encourage free discussion in its columns, which suggested that the press, too, was to benefit from the new policy.

Three months after the latter statement, however,

[14] Liu Tsun-chi, "The Press in New China," *People's China*, No. 12 (December), 1950, pp. 8-10, 31.

[15] Quoted in *People's China*, No. 3 (August), 1950, p. 25.

[16] Liu, *op. cit.*

[17] Hu Yu-chih, "Facts on the Chinese Press," *China Reconstructs*, No. 1 (January-February), 1953, pp. 18-21.

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Jen-min jih-pao returned to the subject to state that, while there should be free intra-party discussion, party members could not be permitted to air their differences outside the party.[18] Since, quite obviously, lifting restrictions upon the free publication of criticisms in the press would bare internal party differences to the general public, it would appear that the earlier promise has been reconsidered and any significant change in the content and nature of the Chinese Communist press effectively precluded.

As for the greater intellectual freedom proclaimed by Mao, there has been a considerable amount of officially-inspired discussion regarding its advantages and disadvantages, but remarkably little evidence of the actual, voluntary exercise by artists, writers, and scholars of their supposed right of free expression. In fact, their reticence led a vice-chairman of the party-sponsored Union of Chinese Writers to declare in a speech on November 22, 1956, that "it was not a good sign for everyone to keep quiet."[19] The attitude of the intellectuals is hardly surprising, however, considering that they and the public at large are constantly being reminded that Communist law does not seek "to tie the hands of those who are opposed to domestic and foreign enemies. . . . It seeks only to tie down the hands of the counterrevolutionaries."[20] This indicates little leeway for intellectual independence.

DULL AS THE Chinese mainland press has become under communism's enforced *Gleichschaltung,* this does not mean that it is not informative to the discerning observer. It faithfully mirrors the Communists' ambitious efforts to reshape the institutions, life and thinking of a nation of 600,000,000 people and furnishes valuable, if sometimes unwitting, clues to the problems which they are encountering. In this sense, the very propaganda which the media of information, upon party command, dispense from day to day is revealing: its shifting emphasis, direction and intensity serve as guides to what the party leadership is thinking and where the major problems of the moment lie.

But from the standpoint of the effectiveness of the press as a domestic propaganda weapon, dullness has its drawbacks. *Jen-min jih-pao* itself acknowledged (April 26, 1956) that poorness of content may be retarding the further expansion of the Chinese Communist press. There have also been indications of official annoyance over the fact that some subscribers to the party organs do not bother to read them.[21]

The question remains whether the official propaganda line is genuinely believed by the majority of those who do read the newspapers and, hence, whether the vast press machine which the party has built up is really as effective, in the long run, as one might assume. There have been some negative indications on this score, from the party itself. *Jen-min jih-pao* on January 24, 1957, for example, openly registered the party's disappointment over the inadequate effectiveness of propaganda aimed at convincing the peasants of the virtues of collectivization. Again, on February 22, it complained that many peasants still could not "fully realize the [proper] relationship between collective and individual interest." In view of the particularly intensive propaganda campaign that has been waged on the subject of collectivization, these admissions are significant.

To be sure, the innate conservatism of the peasants is a hard propaganda nut to crack, but evidently doubts have also arisen concerning the effectiveness of Communist efforts to indoctrinate Chinese youth. This was revealed in a backhanded manner by an article in the party youth organ, *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien* (China Youth), on September 16, 1956. The author of the article called to task those who doubted, "on no grounds whatsoever," that some members of the Youth League—supposedly embracing the elite of Chinese Communist youth—were really "enthusiastic" about the party, and who questioned the young Communists' motives.

The Impact of Hungary

If there had been any incipient tendency toward a relaxation of authoritarian controls, including those over the press, prior to the insurrection in Hungary, that event definitely weakened it. The development of the Hungarian uprising from a local manifestation of dissatisfaction within the framework of communism to a nationwide revolt against the Communist system itself jolted the Chinese Communist leadership profoundly, and the result has been a diminution of talk about freer expression, coupled with a renewed emphasis on counterrevolutionary dangers. Thus, *China Youth* addressed this admonition to its young readers, whose Hungarian counterparts had touched off the powder-keg of rebellion, in an editorial on November 17, 1956:

[18] Editorial, October 9, 1956.

[19] NCNA, Peiping dispatch, November 22, 1956.

[20] Li Ch'i, "Strengthening the People's Democratic Legislative System of China," *Jen-min jih-pao,* November 6, 1956.

[21] On August 13, 1956, NCNA reported that the State Council had ordered employees of the government and other institutions to pay for their own subscriptions because many of them were failing to read the party organs.

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From the Hungarian incident we see clearly that democracy should have a certain limit. Not realizing the limited sphere of democracy, the Nagy government gave way and carried out a "benevolent policy" toward counterrevolution for a few days, with the result that serious damage was done to the party and working people of Hungary. . . . Chairman Mao has said point-blank that dictatorship must be enforced *vis-a-vis* counterrevolutionaries, that "they are only allowed to behave well and are not allowed to speak and act wildly."

It appears unlikely, therefore, that there will be any change in the rigid party regimentation of the Chinese Communist press in the foreseeable future. This, in turn, means that the party leadership will continue to be faced with a dilemma in its efforts to render the press a more effective instrument of its will. For while a regimented, subservient press, which subjects the citizen to a constant and dully monotonous barrage of propaganda at every turn, has undoubtedly succeeded in converting some, it is evident that it has failed to convince important segments of the population. A relaxation of the bonds restricting freedom of expression certainly would help to build up greater public trust, as well as interest, in the press, but the party obviously is not prepared to risk the possible consequences of an unimpeded exchange of competitive ideas. It can only hope that the effectiveness of its propaganda machine will not be put to the final test.

* * *

Editors' Postscript: Since the preceding article was written, its conclusions regarding the extent and limits of the Chinese Communist "thaw" have been strikingly corroborated by events in Mao's China. Late in April 1957 the Chinese party leadership announced the launching of a new *cheng feng* (rectification) movement to cleanse the party of the recurrent evils of "bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism." In deference to the policy proclaimed earlier in the slogan of "Let the hundred flowers blossom, let the hundred schools contend," the leadership invited the so-called "democratic parties" and other non-Communist groups to join in a drive to freely criticize the party's shortcomings. The criticisms were mild and innocuous at first, but by the beginning of June the campaign seemed either to be getting out of hand or to be a spectacularly contrived display of the party's new leniency. There were suggestions by the democratic party spokesmen that bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism were inherent in socialism and Communist dictatorship; Ch'u An-p'ing, chief editor of *Kwang-ming jih-pao,* assailed the Communist idea of a "party kingdom" as the cause of "worsening relations between the party and the masses"; and Lung Yun, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, voiced some sharp criticisms of the Soviet Union. The most daring outburst came from Ko P'ei-ch'i, a lecturer at the Peiping People's University, who flatly stated that the Chinese masses do not want Communist Party leadership and warned party members that "if you are no good, the masses may strike you down."

This was quite obviously a more proliferous blossoming of the flowers than the party could afford to tolerate. There ensued a series of attacks on the "rightists" both by the party organs and by the democratic groups themselves, undoubtedly with party inspiration. Thus far, no direct disciplinary action by the party itself has been reported, but Premier Chou En-lai, in a report delivered before the National People's Congress on June 26 (NCNA, Peiping, same date), bluntly accused the "right-wing elements" of trying "to drive our country from the path of socialism to the path of capitalism" and "to get our state power away from the vanguard of the working class—away from the leadership of the Communist Party." His reference in almost the same breath to "remnants of counterrevolutionaries . . . who are still trying to engage in wrecking activities" appeared fraught with dread implications.

Of particular interest in connection with the press is the fact that both the editor and the director of *Kwang-ming jih-pao* have been accused of shifting the paper's political line to one hostile to socialism and the CPC and friendly to bourgeois ideas. On June 14, *Jen-min jih-pao* editorially condemned not only *Kwang-ming jih-pao* but also *Wen-hui pao* for "highlighting the bourgeois viewpoint" and called for a "two-front struggle against both left and right deviations" in journalism. This would appear to doom whatever budding hopes might have arisen for a greater measure of freedom for the Chinese Communist press.

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Sino-Soviet Collaboration: Past and Present

C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How: *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927*
Columbia University Press, New York, 1956.

H. L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, and Benjamin Shwartz: *Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains*
Harper, New York, 1957.

Reviewed by Allen S. Whiting

DESPITE THE WIDE DISPARITY in time and substance between the Sino-Soviet relationships examined in these two studies, both books offer insights which are highly pertinent to present and prospective world political problems. The joint work of Dr. Wilbur and Miss How is not only a fascinating piece of historical scholarship which sheds new light on the Soviet-Kuomintang alliance of 1924-27 and the early development of Chinese communism; it is at the same time a documented case-study of Soviet aid to an indigenous nationalist movement and of the political tactics of the "united front"—both of which are again being exploited today, not only by Moscow but also by its Peiping ally, in the critical areas of the Middle East and of South and Southeast Asia. The Wilbur-How study thus lends timely reinforcement to the conclusions of the second book under review, which combines an appraisal of present Sino-Soviet tactics and their impact with a balanced assessment of the inner solidarity of the Moscow-Peiping axis.

Before discussing the Wilbur-How volume further, it may be helpful to recall, in brief outline, the historical setting in which the early Soviet tie with the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang developed. In China, the early 1920's found the republic born of the 1911 revolution divided and chaotic. The legally recognized government at Peking had become an impotent pawn in the power-struggles of ambitious warlords, and its claim to national authority was disputed by a rival government established at Canton by the Kuomintang leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sun's program called for a nationalist revolution to unify China, free it of foreign "imperialism" and modernize its political structure along democratic lines. But to realize these goals, he needed assistance in building an efficient, politically disciplined army and in strengthening the organization of the Kuomintang.

Meanwhile, at Moscow, the leaders of the new Soviet state saw their hopes for the spread of Communist revolution in Europe fading rapidly. Looking to China, however, they discerned a favorable opportunity, through aid to the Kuomintang, both to foment trouble for the capitalist powers and to work toward the ultimate transformation of the Chinese "bourgeois democratic" revolution into a Communist revolution on the Soviet model. During 1922-23, these Soviet aims converged with the needs of the Chinese Nationalists to forge the Soviet-Kuomintang alliance. By its terms Sun Yat-sen agreed, in return for Soviet political advice and military tutelage, to admit the Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang.

It is with the inner workings of the alliance and the conspiratorial activities conducted under its protection by the Soviet advisers and their Chinese Communist allies that a large part of the documentation presented by Dr. Wilbur and Miss How deals. All fifty documents contained in the book were originally among a voluminous amount of such materials seized in a sudden Chinese police raid on the Military Attaché's office of the Soviet Embassy at Peking on April 6, 1927, not long before the final rupture of the Soviet-Kuomintang alliance.[1] Many of the seized

Dr. Whiting is a member of the political science faculty at Michigan State University and author of *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1954.) He is currently on leave from the university to engage in research for the Rand Corporation.

[1] The raid on the Soviet Embassy was carried out by order of Chang Tso-lin, the warlord of Manchuria, whose troops then controlled Peking. A bitter foe of the Kuomintang, as well as of the Russians, Chang evidently ordered the raid in order to discredit the Kuomintang by showing its subjection to Soviet and Communist influences. Chiang Kai-shek himself denounced the raid as an outrage in a note to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Peking.

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documents were subsequently published in various languages, but most of those selected by the present authors have not hitherto been available in English translation. It should also be mentioned, in view of Soviet charges that the document translations publicized abroad in the wake of the seizure were forgeries, that the authors devote a brilliant chapter to the problem of authenticity. In it they explain in detail the exhaustive methods of cross-checking against independent Chinese and Japanese sources by which they verified, beyond all doubt, the overwhelming bulk of these materials.

AS THEY INDICATE in their introduction, the authors deliberately steer clear of Soviet and Comintern policy-making in Moscow, with its entanglements in the bitter Stalin-Trotsky feud and in conflicts between the Comintern and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Instead, they focus their attention on "Chinese aspects of the Revolution" and on the implementation, in China, of Moscow policy as it affected the Chinese Communists and their relationship with the Kuomintang. The documents are arranged in a pattern of logical development, and continuity is further aided by the interspersion of lucid analytical chapters by Miss How. In them she makes use of much valuable material, again carefully cross-checked, from the edited diaries of Chiang Kai-shek.

Many strands are woven into the revealing story told in the documents. In view of their seizure in the office of the Military Attaché, it is natural that there is heavy emphasis on the activities of the Soviet military advisers, and less about the activities of the political agents who operated under the direction of Sun Yat-sen's top adviser, Mikhail Borodin. Political developments, however, concerned the military advisers, too, and are revealingly discussed in many of their reports. Thus the documents testify to the tortuous efforts of the Communists, while professing complete loyalty to the Kuomintang leadership and its policies, to maneuver themselves ever closer to a controlling position in the party. The often groping efforts of the Soviet advisers, working in—to most of them—*terra incognita,* and the growing resistance of Chiang Kai-shek to Communist political machinations are other interesting threads in the story.

Intelligence reports of Soviet military advisers stationed at Canton, Wuhan, Shanghai, Peking and even at remote Kalgan testify to both successes and difficulties in their efforts to gain commanding influence in the Nationalist and Kuominchün armies. Thus, a report by the head of the Soviet advisory team in South China claimed considerable success in capturing key army positions by the end of 1925, but lamented that it was "not possible to penetrate further to obtain complete control because of . . . the shortage of advisers . . . and the complete lack of interpreters."

This objective difficulty evidently was compounded by the subjective attitude of superiority of some Russian advisers, one of whom remarked disdainfully that "Chinese officers are entirely ignorant of military science." Another report, however, suggests that the Russians were not entirely unaware of such pitfalls, for it deprecated the frequent assumption by advisers of "leading positions, directly handling all matters" and warned against "excessive supervision of the generals and various organs." The same report acknowledged that "we normally pay no attention to Chinese habits, customs, and etiquette."

Nevertheless, the grip acquired by the Soviet advisers in the highest echelons of the Kuomintang military organization seemed on the way to becoming a stranglehold. A summary report of February 1926 boasted frankly: "Our military director [General Victor P. Rogachev] actually acts as Chief of the General Staff, but his official position is that of adviser to the Chief of the General Staff." Similarly, in the operations, intelligence, and administrative branches of the army, as well as in the naval and aviation bureaus, it was not the nominal Chinese chiefs but their Soviet advisers who "were, in fact, at the head. . . ." The summary also reveals significant action to insinuate Communist influence into the indoctrination of the army rank and file by placing "as many workers from the Left Wing as possible in the political organs of the Army."

THE SUCCESS of the Soviet advisers in the military sphere was paralleled by rising Communist influence in Kuomintang political affairs, reflected in the triumph of the Left Wing in the struggle for party control following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925. Moscow's strategy, however, succeeded too well, for Chiang Kai-shek, now one of the two leading contenders for the Kuomintang leadership, was impelled by the dual Communist threat to strike his first vigorous blow against them and the Kuomintang Left on March 20, 1926. One of the documents in the Wilbur-How book records the discussion which took place at a conference of Soviet advisers held at Canton to consider the causes and implications of Chiang's action. Nilov, adviser to the Nationalist Fourth Army, blamed the Chinese Communists for going too far too fast, adding this graphic description of the situation in the Army:

[Communist] political workers man the most important posts and appoint members of their own cliques to various posts. They secretly pursue tasks unknown to the respective com-

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manding officers. . . . In each of the divisions of the Whampoa Army, four out of five commissars are Communists. (The Chief of the Political Department of the Army [Chou En-lai] is also a Communist.) Of the sixteen commissars in each regiment, five are Communists.

The frankly pragmatic and calculating nature of the Soviet strategy was underlined by the decision of the advisers, in spite of the March 20 coup and their recognition that Chiang might be planning further anti-Communist moves, to continue cultivating him as long as possible in order to use his influence in the Kuomintang. In another document dealing with the coup, General Stepanov, adviser with the First Army, affirmed: "There is no doubt that we should, in the light of the overall program utilize him by all means . . . by satisfying his desire for glory and enabling him to achieve greater power and strength than he now enjoys."

Parallel with the activities carried on in the Nationalist armies in the south, other Soviet advisers were working toward the same objectives at the Kalgan headquarters of the Kuominchün armies led by the northern wardlord, Feng Yu-hsiang, whose support was desired by both the Kuomintang and Moscow. Soviet calculations with respect to Feng were explained by one adviser in these characteristically Machiavellian terms:

If Feng is consistent and of permanent benefit to us, we should see that his influence grows strong and lasting. On the other hand, if we wish to ally with him merely because he is an enemy of pro-Japanese and conservative groups, we need only build up his fighting force in order to attain our objective, after which we may destroy the deceitful fellow.

Though the Soviet courtship of Feng achieved a visible measure of success during 1926, it ultimately failed as completely as did the continued Soviet efforts to cultivate Chiang Kai-shek. There was a temporary reconciliation after the March 20 coup, but intensified Communist efforts to strengthen the Kuomintang Left Wing against Chiang's "New Right" finally led Chiang, in April 1927, to launch a bloody anti-Communist purge which spelled the end of the coalition and was soon followed by the mass expulsion of the Soviet advisers. The entire edifice of Moscow's grand strategy for capturing the Chinese revolution had toppled like a house of cards, but its lessons are still valuable today.

THE SPECIALISTS on Soviet and Chinese communism whose contributions appear in the Council on Foreign Relations study, *Moscow-Peking Axis,* have no such revealing documents and secret reports as did Dr. Wilbur and Miss How to buttress their findings. They are obliged to grapple almost intuitively with ritualized releases from the Soviet and Chinese Communist news agencies monotonously swearing to the "unshakable unity" of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Yet, despite this severe lack of trustworthy factual materials, the various analyses presented in the book offer penetrating and plausible interpretations of the consequences of the alliance, actual and potential, both for its partners and for the world.

Especially valuable is Professor Eckstein's evaluation of the problems inherent in the Sino-Soviet effort to harmonize economic structures and goals which are competitive rather than complementary. Pointing out that neither member of the axis wants what the other is most willing to export, he concludes that "a high level of trade between China and the Soviet Union is disadvantageous for both trading partners." He also notes the strain imposed on Soviet capital resources by the mounting demands of the Chinese industrialization program, but adds the caution that "from a Soviet point of view . . . this may be more than compensated by possible political gain which Moscow can reap from China's economic dependence upon the Soviet Union."

ELEMENTS OF UNITY and divergence between Moscow and Peiping in the ideological sphere are ably dealt with by Professor Schwartz, who points to two major departures by the Chinese Communists from Moscow orthodoxy.[2] The first developed during the 1930's and centered on the concept of avenues to power. As the author points out, "with the clear emergence of the Maoist strategy as the only viable path in China, the notion of the necessity of an actual urban proletariat base ceased to have operational consequences. This element of orthodoxy had become a dead letter." The second Chinese departure came after the Communist seizure of power in 1949 and was marked by the Mao regime's elaboration of a concept of "people's democracy" wholly at variance with Soviet theory as applied in Eastern Europe. Not until the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956 did the Soviet leaders officially sanction this "different path to socialism."

Moscow's acceptance of such deviations on the part of its Soviet ally underscores Professor Schwartz' warning that ideological differences in themselves do not prompt open rupture of an alliance based upon

[2] Sections of Professor Schwartz' chapter appeared as an article in *Problems of Communism,* No. 5 (September-October) 1954, under the title, "China and the Soviet Theory of People's Democracy."

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expediency and power considerations as well as on shared values. But his conclusion is well taken:

The drastic disintegration of the ideology—a disintegration to which the Chinese party has contributed substantially —has greatly weakened ideology as a binding fabric, not only between Moscow and Peking but among all the states of the Communist world.

Despite the fissures in its ideological armor, the Communist bloc continues to exert a political impact of deep concern to the whole non-Communist world. Professors Boorman and Mosely analyze this impact, with particular emphasis on the adjacent countries of Asia and the Middle East. Neither author is sanguine about the prospects that political rivalry or a conflict of interests over respective spheres of influence in these areas will bring an open schism between Moscow and Peiping. On the contrary, both anticipate continued Sino-Soviet collaboration toward the end of bringing the target areas under ultimate bloc domination.

Professors Boorman and Mosely also agree with respect to the possibility of a return by the Communists to the violent insurrectionary policy practiced between 1948 and 1951, but they believe it to be more probable that primary Communist strategy will focus on exploiting economic and political points of weakness in order to expand their influence. The means employed will include stepped-up "cultural exchanges", dramatic announcements of economic aid, and military assistance in cases where it is likely to cause increased tension among non-Communist countries.

To combat these tactics, Professor Mosely emphasizes the need to back up the "strategic consolidation of the free world" with flexible and imaginative programs of political, economic and cultural cooperation capable of winning "the sincere support of the peoples of both committed and uncommitted areas." He soberly concludes:

In Asia the free world has both handicaps and advantages. It must examine both realistically if it is to meet successfully the new challenge of the Moscow-Peking axis.

The Making of a Communist

Margarete Buber-Neumann:
Von Potsdam nach Moskau,
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
Stuttgart, 1957.

Reviewed by F. L. Carsten

EIGHT YEARS AGO Margarete Buber-Neumann, widow of the once prominent German Communist leader, Heinz Neumann, and herself a minor party and Comintern functionary in the days of the Weimar Republic, began telling the fascinating but tragic story of her life in a volume entitled *Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler* (As a Prisoner under Stalin and Hitler, Verlag der Zwölf, Munich, 1949).[1] Arrested with her husband in the Soviet Union during the Great Stalin Purge of 1937-38, she spent several years in Soviet prisons and forced labor camps while Neumann himself was "liquidated"; then, at the height of Stalin's friendship with Hitler, she was turned over by the NKVD, along with many other German Communist refugees in the USSR, to the Gestapo, which held her prisoner in the infamous Ravensbrück concentration camp until the close of World War II. It was these harsh experiences which were related in Mrs. Buber-Neumann's first book, giving it unique value as a comparative study of the methods of totalitarian tyranny, Communist and Fascist, in dealing with political "enemies."

Mr. Carstens has been a lecturer in modern history at the University of London since 1947, and is well known both as a commentator for the BBC and as a contributor to British journals on the subjects of German history and current affairs. He is author of *The Origins of Prussia* (London: Oxford University Press), 1954.

[1] Published in English under the title *Under Two Dictators,* Dodd Mead (New York and London) 1951.

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In her new autobiographical work, *Von Potsdam nach Moskau* (From Potsdam to Moscow), Mrs. Buber-Neumann rounds out her story with an account of the earlier part of her life up to her imprisonment in 1938. From the historical standpoint the book adds little to existing knowledge of Communist policies and politics of the period and is marred by some rather obvious and exaggerated special pleading in defense of Neumann. It remains, nonetheless, a highly absorbing personal account by one who turned to communism out of youthful idealism, only in the end to become one of its countless victims.

The author was born into a well-to-do middle-class family living in Potsdam, the military capital of the Kaiser's Germany, in the early years of the century. Rebelling against her strait-laced Prussian environment, she turned during World War I to the German youth movement, which sought an escape from the harsh realities of the times in an unconventional life close to nature. After the war, like many others in the movement, she became more radical, broke with her family, and after some wandering about in leftist youth circles joined the Young Communist League and later the Communist Party.

THE CHAPTERS DEALING with this part of her life are among the most interesting in Mrs. Buber-Neumann's book. They picture the atmosphere of spiritual unrest which prevailed in left-wing literary, artistic and intellectual circles in Berlin of the early 1920's, and they lay bare the psychological motivations of rebellion against family, school and society which impelled many young Germans of bourgeois background like the author's to turn to communism and the Russian Revolution as the embodiment of the ideals for which they found no satisfaction in their own immediate surroundings and the rather dreary politics of Weimar Germany. Their spirit of revolt drove them irresistibly toward the only party that claimed to be truly revolutionary, a party which then was still relatively free from the bureaucratic disease that soon afflicted it.

By the late 1920's the disease had already set in, and Mrs. Buber-Neumann herself became a cog, albeit a very minor one, in the party's bureaucratic machine. Besides serving as instructor of a party cell in one of Berlin's best-known department stores, she worked on the staff of the Comintern's official German organ, *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz* (Inprekorr), which had its offices in the famous center of the German CP, Karl Liebknecht Haus. It was these activities which led to her intimate association with the young and ambitious Neumann, a well-to-do Berlin lawyer's son, who had turned Communist, received training in Moscow, and become one of the triumvirs ruling the German party.

The remaining chapters, about two-thirds of the entire book, center around Neumann and his fate: after serving the Comintern in various countries, including China, he fell from grace, was recalled to Moscow and perished in the 1937 purge. It is understandable, but at the same time unfortunate, that these chapters are written largely to vindicate Neumann and to refute criticisms of his policies. No one will deny that he was made the scapegoat for the disastrous defeat suffered by the German Communists in 1933, for which the real responsibility rested with Moscow. Still the fact remains that of the Communist leaders of the period, he was among the least realistic, the most inclined to political adventures, and the readiest to change his line at Moscow's orders.

Few would question, either, that Neumann was a man of great personal courage. During the period of his ascendancy in the German party leadership, he—a hated Jew—dared even to attend and speak out at Nazi meetings. However, his order to the German Communists in the early 1930's to "beat up the Fascists wherever you meet them" was clearly unrealistic, not only because it was generally the Communists who got the worst of the street fights and free-for-all battles they staged against the Nazis' much better-trained strong-arm squads, but also because the party was led to divert its energies from genuine working-class activity into fruitless tactics of terrorism. The German rightists and the Nazis certainly were guilty of the organized murder of their political opponents; even so, it is strangely incongruous to find Mrs. Buber-Neumann, now an avowed anti-Communist, attempting to defend the German Communists' pursuit of a policy of counter-terrorism—evidenced by the actual assassination of two hated police officers and the unsuccessful attempt on the life of General von Seeckt—on the ground that "it was surely the obvious course to repay these [rightist] methods in the same coin". (p. 278)

IN HER ATTEMPT to vindicate Neumann, the author also makes the dubious allegation that his downfall resulted from the fact that from 1931 onward Stalin, fearing that a Communist-run Germany would be dangerous to Soviet pre-eminence as the fountainhead of Communist leadership, "did everything to weaken systematically the militant strength of the German CP and thus to prevent a Communist revolution" in Germany (p. 285). Stalin and the Comintern leadership certainly were deeply contemptuous of the German Communist leaders and, as realists, undoubtedly recognized at an early date the extreme weakness of the

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German party and the possibility, or even probability, of a Nazi triumph. This, however, is far different from alleging that they preferred the victory of their mortal enemies, the Nazis, to that of a German CP dominated by their puppets and cleansed of all independent revolutionary elements unacceptable to Moscow. The Thälmanns, Remmeles and Ulbrichts could never have broken loose from the tight leading-strings by which they were manipulated from Moscow; nor was there any danger of their being replaced by more independent leaders because the whole party machine was staffed by their—and Moscow's—obedient tools. Thus, a Communist victory in Germany could hardly have been viewed in the Kremlin as a menace to Soviet Russia; on the contrary, it would have strengthened her enormously, both politically and economically.

THERE ARE OTHER passages in Mrs. Buber-Neumann's book which seem either scarcely credible or extremely naive. Referring, for example, to the disturbances which took place in Berlin on May Day, 1929, when the Communists were directed by Berlin party headquarters to go into the streets in violation of an order by the Police President of the capital prohibiting all open-air demonstrations, the author—who was then a paid party official—blandly writes, "The only thing I knew of was the prohibition of the May Day demonstrations. I knew nothing of the intention of the CP to go into the streets in spite of this." (p. 151)

Again, in connection with her activities in selling party literature to Berlin workers, one encounters the naive statement that "I do not know to the present day why these people bought this material from us" (p. 211)—certainly a curious commentary regarding a period when unemployment and economic depression were impelling thousands of German workers toward communism as their only hope of salvation. Nor is the author very convincing when she claims that the party members "naturally blamed their functionaries for letting meetings become more and more choked in bureaucratic forms" (p. 209). In reality, since all critical opposition elements had long since been driven out of the party, the rank-and-file accepted every act or antic of their leaders, and every shift in the party line dictated from above, with complete docility. Not a word, for example, was ever uttered except perhaps in strict privacy between friends, against the suicidal policy of fighting the Socialists as "the chief enemy"—a policy not abandoned until 1935 when Hitler was already triumphant.

THE CONCLUDING CHAPTERS of the book relate the author's experiences while working for the Comintern outside Germany, including the final period in the Soviet Union prior to her arrest. They contain many interesting sidelights on the life of the party privileged in their Black Sea villas and resorts, on the "ghetto"-like existence of Comintern employees living in Moscow's Lux Hotel, and on the personal surroundings and recreational habits of such Soviet leaders as Kaganovitch, Mikoyan and Orjonikidze. They show how rigid had become the division of Soviet society, and even of Comintern employees, into hierarchical groups, each with its own graduated level of privileges in matters of living accommodation and food supplies.

These chapters also provide evidence of how primitive and inefficient the Comintern apparatus was, how infantile its rules of conspiracy and its methods of conveying money or contraband from one country to another, and how even the false passports issued to its agents were so obviously bogus that they could be used only at great risk. Finally, they convey the feeling of nightmarish fear which began to permeate party circles as the great purges loomed and the party's control commissions started framing charges against "deviationists."

Here the reader will find many interesting details, but neither sensational disclosures nor entirely new evidence. Mrs. Buber-Neumann quite clearly was very much on the outer fringe of party developments, and what Neumann himself knew of the secrets of the inner circle he evidently did not pass on to her. The book thus contains a great deal that appears to be rumor or conjecture gleaned from Comintern gossip, and the author fails to make any clear distinction between this kind of unconfirmed information and hard proven facts.

Still, despite all its defects, the book is fascinating and often moving. As it relates the experiences of a lowly German CP functionary at home and in exile, it presents a picture that is in many ways more typical than that which emerges from the revelations of persons who were far more prominent in party affairs.

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Moral Judgment and Historical Ambiguity—

A Socialist View

By Sidney Hook

IT IS ONE of the great cultural paradoxes of our century that men of impressive intellectual gifts, nurtured in democratic and/or socialist traditions, should have taken upon themselves—perhaps without realizing its full implications—the role of apologists for totalitarian despotism. The paradox becomes all the more astonishing when these men turn out to be not followers of doctrinaire ideologies, but, like George Bernard Shaw or Sidney Webb essentially pragmatists and empiricists, whose belief in socialism stems more from moral ideals than from acceptance of the Marxian economic equations of capitalist doom.

There are various types of apologists, of course. There are the eminent men of letters and the arts, people such as Sartre and Picasso, who enjoy a kind of *Narrenfreiheit* with respect to politics, but whose commitments would probably not survive genuine knowledge of the actual facts of Soviet life. There are the cynics and opportunists, who pose as left-wing Socialists, and who press for a united front with the Communist Party in the hope of being properly rewarded for their efforts once the Communists are in power. And there are the intellectually honest left-wing Socialists, who profess abhorrence of Communist ideology, but who nevertheless remain adamant in treating Communist parties as "brother" Socialist parties striving to achieve the socialist commonwealth in their own distinctive way. In their view, unity with Communist parties may not be feasible or desirable at the moment, but there would be no objection to it *in principle,* inasmuch as the future may bring both "proletarian" parties much closer together. On the other hand, they assert that unity with anti-Communist parties is *in principle* inadmissable any time, anywhere. For this means capitulation to reaction, to "monopoly capitalism", and under certain circumstances, to "counterrevolution."

A good example of this latter attitude is provided by the recent writings of the English socialist, G. D. H. Cole, now president of the Fabian Society—in particular, by his stand on the Hungarian revolution. In an article in the January 12 issue of *The New Statesman and Nation,* Cole condemns the Kremlin's action, but he offers an explanation of this action which could easily be interpreted as an apology for the Kadar restoration, and which sounds strangely ambiguous to any Socialist for whom freedom comes first.

While all other observers predicted that a liberal regime would have followed the Stalinist downfall in Hungary, Cole is not so sure:

Sheer chaos . . . threatened the country; and it is not possible to say what would have happened had not the Soviet Union, after once evacuating Budapest, sent back its tanks and lent its backing to the attempt to construct a new Communist government under the leadership of Janos Kadar.

"Peace and order," of course, were the watchwords under which Metternich and the Russians suppressed the revolutionary disturbances of the nineteenth century, but it would be an injustice to Cole not to see the difference between his desire for peace and order and those of Khrushchev's forebears. Cole is not sure that the Hungarians would have democratically decided their own destinies. He fears that they would have fought with each other, and that out of this civil war something even worse than Kadar's terror might have emerged.

Nevertheless, I recognize that the Russians had a difficult choice to make; for I do not feel able to believe that, had they stood aside, the Hungarian people would have been in a position freely and democratically to decide their own destiny. The various elements that had joined together in the uprising, having no common policy, would have been bound to fall out; and probably there would have been, even in the absence of western intervention, a civil war of which it is impossible to predict the outcome.

In his first article on Hungary Cole distinctly gives the impression, despite some ambiguities, that the primary concern of the democratic Socialist is to give the majority of a population an opportunity freely to choose the regime under which it wants to live, including the form of property relations. "People have a right", he declares, "to self-determination." If he grants this, he must also grant that they have a right to determine for themselves whether

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to live in a collectivized or non-collectivized society, regardless of what these terms signify today.

Unfortunately, by April 20th Mr. Cole seems to have developed some doubts about self-determination and the freedom of peoples. Self-determination is not an absolute good. If there is any danger that a people may freely vote for a Fascist regime (which he does not define) they may justifiably be prevented from doing so even by the ungentle methods of the Kremlin. The ambiguity in Cole's position on Hungary now becomes explicable. Since he is not sure that fascism would not have resulted from the popular revolution against Hungarian Stalinism, he is not sure about the wisdom or justification of Socialist condemnation of the Kadar terror regime. Of course, he doesn't like the massacre of the innocents any more than the next Fabian but political intelligence must not yield to mere moral sentiment. No summary can do justice to Cole's own words:

Most of us who do, as Socialists, repudiate the Soviet Union's action do so, at any rate in part, because we set a high value on the principle of national self-determination, and uphold the right of the Hungarian people, at any rate within very wide limits, to determine their course of action without being dictated to by any external force. If so, we seem to be impelled towards agreeing that it is irrelevant to the issue whether the Hungarians, left to themselves, would have established a national Communist, or a Social-democratic, or a bourgeois parliamentarian, or even a Fascist kind of state, provided only that it had been the real choice of a majority of the people. But are most of us prepared to go so far? I, for one, am not. I regard fascism as a system so abominable in itself and so dangerous to the world's peace that I am ready to defend action designed to prevent any people from setting up a Fascist regime, subject only to considerations of sheer expediency in any particular case. I shall doubtless be asked whether I feel the same about communism—to which the answer is that I do not, because despite its immoralism, it has shown itself also a great liberating force through the extension of education and social services to the masses previously excluded from them. It is, therefore, likely to become liberalized, even against its will, as the effects of these are shown in popular pressures for greater personal and political freedom. . . .

Despite Cole's refusal to accept the principle of self-determination if a people vote itself into "fascism," he concludes his analysis with a forthright condemnation of the Soviet repressive action because he is still not sure that the success of the Hungarian revolution would have led to "fascism" or war. He generously gives the Hungarian freedom fighters the benefit of the doubt. Nonetheless, the reasons he sets forth for his position are altogether inadequate. There is a great danger that anyone who argues in the manner of Cole will find those arguments used to support the positions of the two other varieties of "socialism," positions of which Cole undoubtedly disapproves, that of the politically irresponsible men of genius, and that of the plain opportunists.

Note the fact that the key term "fascism" is not defined by Cole and that the enormous differences between a Mussolini regime, a Franco, Peron, Salazar, Horthy regime, and a Hitler regime—all called Fascist—are ignored. Cole is not so daft as to believe the Communist nonsense about fascism being the dictatorship of finance capital. Otherwise he could hardly speak of the threat of *Hungarian* fascism! A Fascist regime must for him be any regime which is (a) intrinsically abominable and (b) dangerous to the world's peace.

WHAT MAKES A REGIME intrinsically abominable or, to use Cole's own words, "abominable in itself"? This author submits that the term applies to any regime which organizes or countenances such things as the frame-up of innocent persons, periodic purges untrammeled by law, concentration camps, the taking and punishing of hostages, the torture and degredation of human beings. If this is so, it takes only a reading of Khrushchev's famous anti-Stalin speech to realize that in these respects the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China and the satellite countries have been far more abominable than those of some Fascist countries like Italy, Hungary, or Argentina. Only Hitler's regime can be compared to Communist countries in its degree of abomination.

As far as danger to world peace is concerned, there is a curious inconsistency in Cole's approach. To prevent a country from going Fascist and *potentially* threatening world peace, Cole would intervene and *actually* threaten world peace. Because a Fascist country may make war in the future, Cole would intervene and in all likelihood start a war now. But if danger to peace is the primary consideration, it makes no difference what the form of regime. Any regime, even a democratic one, which threatens peace, in Cole's view, should become the object of intervention by the powers which love peace and order. Things are apt to become confusing here. For some of Mr. Cole's fellow-Fabians recently declared that Israel, France and England threatened the peace of the world. Who will intervene to save whom? Was not the Kremlin's threat to bomb the West a threat to peace?

Further, it is a matter of plain historical fact that some Fascist countries have *not* threatened the peace of the world. Franco Spain, for instance, has done no saber rattling. On the other hand, Tito at the time of the Trieste difficulties almost precipitated a war while Communist China in Korea with the help of the Kremlin actually unleashed one. And all this aside from aggressions of an internal kind as in the Baltic countries and the *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia. Should the democratic powers have intervened there, particularly since these aggressions outraged the freely given consent of the people? Finally, if we were to be guided merely by declaration of warlike intentions and predictions of inevitable struggle between democracy and communism, Communist ideology from Lenin to Stalin is replete with incitements to preparation for inevitable war despite all the talk about coexistance.

In terms of his own criteria Cole cannot really distinguish between Fascist and Communist regimes. He is therefore compelled to fall back on a position which violates the principles of socialist morality he himself has professed. In his article of January 12th, he had written: "I hold that socialism can legitimately be sought for

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only by means consistent with decent moral conduct . . ." By April 20th he is saying in effect that if socialism cannot be brought about by decent moral conduct, then let us reconcile ourselves if it is brought about by indecent moral conduct, for time—and the forces of production—will heal the indecencies.

Even here Cole is clearly mistaken. He falls victim to the blindest obsession of the orthodox Marxist—the fetishism of the forces of production. He assumes that if only heavy industry is built and collectivized, in time literacy, culture and political freedom will necessarily result. The events of two generations, which seem to have taught him nothing, stand in the way of this naive belief. First, Fascist countries, too, have extended the literacy of their populations, notably Japan and Germany. If literacy by itself necessarily germinated a desire for freedom, what would be true for Communist countries, when they were literate, would be true for Fascist countries as well. But literacy, where the government holds an absolute monopoly over what may be read and written, is a dubious weapon in the struggle for freedom. It is more often another instrument for making totalitarianism more total.

Second, Fascist countries have also on occasion "contributed social services to the masses previously excluded from them." Peron was the darling of the Argentina workers for that very reason. Even Hitler and Mussolini did something for the unemployed which the liberal regimes they displaced had failed to do. It remains to be seen whether the improvement in the standard of living in Communist countries surpasses that in non-Communist, even Fascist countries.

Of course, even if it turned out that the workers in Fascist countries were economically privileged over workers in free countries, this would still not reconcile Socialists to the loss of freedom. Better a lean and hungry free man, Mr. Cole would undoubtedly say, than a fat slave under fascism. Yet he cannot bring himself to say the same thing with respect to communism. He must believe that if and when the forces of production under communism become sufficiently ripe—and who is to say when that is?—the freedoms of which the workers have been robbed will necessarily be restored to them.

MR. COLE is altogether too sanguine about this. He overlooks the fact that the Soviet workers had more freedom in the early days of communism than during the last few Five-Year Plans. There is nothing automatic about the rebirth of freedom under the economy of socialism, if a system of forced labor can be called socialism. There have been sporadic revolts against fascism in Germany, Spain, and Argentina. Would it not be absurd to say that these revolts really evolved out of the "maturing" of Fascist economy and culture? It would be absurd but no less absurd than to say the same thing about communism. It is not privilege alone which a ruling group strives to keep but differences in privilege. Fear and terror can exist even when there is no hunger.

It will not surprise the reader at this point to learn that Mr. Cole is in emphatic disagreement with the statement of the Socialist International that "socialism and communism have nothing in common." Now taken literally *this is* untrue because any two things have something in common. For example, socialism and capitalism are both social systems. Socialism and fascism are both social movements. A saint and a sinner are both human, *etc.* But the statement is not intended to be taken literally. It is simply a declaration that a moral abyss separates socialism from communism, an abyss created in part by the murders of tens of thousands of democratic Socialists, which nothing Communists now say or do can bridge. Cole does recognize that socialism and communism differ deeply in many ways, but from the tautology that they do not differ *entirely* he seeks to insinuate the conclusion that they do not differ essentially in relation to their basic goals. To be sure their historical origins are the same but so are the historical origins of Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, Calvinism, and Ethical Culture. It is the differences that count, especially when freedom is at stake.

THE FACT THAT Socialists and Communists are both opposed to capitalism does not mean very much until we have a more precise conception of capitalism. The Nazis, too, as their very name proclaimed, were opposed to "capitalism." To be opposed to "capitalism," no matter how it is defined, does not tell us much about a social philosophy until we know what is being proposed as a replacement. It should not take much acuity to realize that there are worse things than democratic capitalism. Hitlerism is one of them and totalitarian communism is another. Totalitarian communism is worse because, among other things, it is a new form of class society, more oppressive than any hitherto developed, at least in Western society. Cole often suggests that the choice is not between societies which have been democratic and Communist dictatorships, but between agrarian societies which knew no democracy whatsoever and communism. Even if this were true, it is hard to see how one can—on moral grounds—justify substituting monolithic dictatorships, whether Communist or Fascist, with their police systems and total disregard for human dignity, for authoritarian agrarian regimes. But it is *not* true. Democracy is a matter of degree, and in every country in which Communists have seized power, whether it be Czechoslovakia or China, Estonia or Albania, there is *less* democracy now than before. As primitive as they were, democratic institutions functioned to some extent, especially in the villages. Public dissent was not a capital crime and often was widespread. Partial corruption is bad enough, even if it is remediable. It cannot justify total Communist oppression—certainly not, one would think, to the democratic Socialist. Where there is some freedom of dissent, it is possible to present alternatives. Where there is no freedom of dissent, how can one get rid of the exploitive and oppressive Communist regime? Mr. Cole does not tell us.

What Mr. Cole *does* tell us, however, is that Communists are not beyond redemption, and that Socialists should be willing to enter into discussions with those Communists whose dogmas have been somewhat liquified under the corrosive impact of recent political events. Indeed, his analysis of the Hungarian Revolution seems to have been motivated not so much by his concern about Hungary as such (though doubtless his thoughts and feelings are genuine and sincere), but rather by his overriding desire to utilize the current ferment and dissatisfaction in Communist ranks for the eventual goal of Socialist-Communist

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unity. It is rather wearying to have to point out, again and again, the dangers inherent in the attempt to establish any working unity with Communists, however discontented. The history of Communist deceptions and betrayals, one would think, should make it clear that there is no more need to form an organization with Communist members in order to discuss the butcheries of Budapest and the lessons to be drawn from it, than there is need to form a common organization with Nazis to discuss the insanities of anti-Semitism. Yet if Mr. Cole, or for that matter any Socialist, is merely interested in *discussing* various issues with Communists without entering into organizational ties with them—a wish to which there should, of course, be no objection—it might be fitting to remind him of a recent statement of Albert Camus, defining the responsibilities of the intellectual of our time:

In certain exceptional circumstances, (the Spanish War, the Hitlerian persecutions and camps, the Stalinist trials and camps, the Hungarian revolt) he should permit no ambiguity about which side he has chosen. He should refuse above all to dilute the effectiveness of his choice by shrewd hair-splittings or prudent reservations, and should leave no doubt as to his personal intention to defend freedom.

Stirrings in the French CP

By Jan Przybyla

THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD of crisis which the world Communist movement has been traversing since the Twentieth CPSU Congress of February 1956, the French Communist Party has unquestionably shown itself the least vulnerable to disintegrative influences, as well as the most resistant to changes of a liberalizing character, of all the Communist parties outside the Soviet orbit. But while the party leadership has retained a firm grip on the reins of control and has refused thus far to retreat substantially from its past Stalinist policies, the last six months have witnessed the appearance in the party ranks of significant stirrings of unrest and rebellion. These have tended to become increasingly vocal, and their effect has been to confront the party headquarters in the Place Kossuth with some uncomfortable problems concerning the maintenance of internal unity and discipline.

One of the more striking evidences of the ferment at work in the party organizations "at the base" has been the success of a small clandestine monthly of about 10,000 circulation, which a group of Communist dissidents began publishing last December under the name of *l'Etincelle* (The Spark). Its editors, in the very first issue, launched a resolute attack on the Stalinist theses of the party leadership:

Your argument is very simple. Anyone in disagreement on the least issue with the present leadership of the party is an opportunist, a defeatist, and a petit-bourgeois. . . . But what does the democratization of the party mean, if not a break with the anti-democratic procedures of the Stalinist period? [1]

But whereas, in the past, the leadership would normally have reacted to such an attack upon itself by vigorously condemning the non-conformists and eventually decreeing their mass expulsion from the party, on this occasion it curiously refrained from any hasty reprisals against the *Etincelle* group. The reason for the adoption of this more prudent course undoubtedly did not lie in any sudden change of heart by the party's Stalinist leaders, but rather in their recognition that the weakened condition of the party in the wake of the Hungarian tragedy made strong repressive action against the dissidents temporarily unwise.

There were, indeed, many evidences indicating that the leadership's declaration of unconditional allegiance to Moscow in the Hungarian crisis had subjected the internal unity of the party to severe strain and cost it much in terms of mass political support. The movement of revolt among the party's intellectual following, both Communist and fellow-traveler, was especially pronounced and spectacular. Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, painter Pablo Picasso, and novelists Simone de Beauvoir and Paul Tillard figured prominently among the many intellectuals who openly—though with varying degrees of firmness—criticized the policies of the party directorate and even hinted at the necessity of a critical re-examination of certain hitherto-accepted articles of Communist ideological faith.

The reverberations on the labor front attracted less public attention, perhaps, than the defections of distinguished intellectuals, but they threatened the party in a particularly vital area. Elections to factory and pro-

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1 From "Reply to Comrades Marcel Servin and Maurice Thorez," *l'Etincelle*, No. 1, December 1956, p. 1.

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fessional committees in many industries revealed declines of 10 to 30 percent in the votes obtained by candidates of the Communist-controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT). Acrid debate concerning the correctness of the party line on the Hungarian issue and demands for ridding the party of its own "cult of the individual"—the individual being Thorez—became commonplace at meetings of party cells in the factories.

There were early indications, too, of a falling off of the party's political voting strength. The first test after Hungary came with the holding of a parliamentary by-election in January 1957 to fill a vacant Chamber of Deputies seat for the 1st Paris District, which embraces several important working-class agglomerations. In the general elections a year earlier the Communists had polled 26 percent of the vote in this district, but in the by-election the party's candidate was defeated by an independent, and the Communist vote dropped to about 23 percent of the ballots cast. The results indicated the abstention of some 40,000 normally Communist voters, evidently in protest against the party's stand on Hungary.

Troubled as it was by these developments, the party leadership, on the basis of its experience of past crises, could interpret the post-Hungary setbacks in factory elections and the Paris by-election as signs of a momentary general trend away from the party which would, in due course, spend or even reverse itself when the public mind shifted to other issues more advantageous to the Communists. (This did, in fact, prove to be the case, as indicated by the results of later factory elections and of two additional parliamentary by-elections, the first in the southern department of Ain in March, and the most recent at Lyons in May-June.[2])

There was, perhaps, less inclination at party headquarters to be complacent about a serious lag in party membership renewals during the first two months of 1957, which seemed to foreshadow a sharp drop from the 430,000 membership officially claimed at the Fourteenth Party Congress in July 1956.[3] Though no figures for membership renewals were officially released by the party, it did not disavow reports in the non-Communist press early in March to the effect that there had been only 287,542 renewals up to February 25.[4] While this figure may be open to question, the party's silence would seem to indicate that the unsatisfactory situation claimed in the reports was substantially true.

However, in a party which traditionally has relied upon tightly-knit organization rather than upon numbers as the essential foundation of its strength, paramount concern focuses on the maintenance of the unity and discipline of the party's hard core. From this standpoint the appearance of *l'Etincelle* had been a serious warning signal though it still spoke within the framework of loyalty to the party—urging it readers, for example, to support the official party organs. The real signal of alarm, however, was the publication in the non-Communist Paris weekly, *l'Express* (politically left-centrist), on February 15, 1957, of an article entitled "The Clandestine Members of the Communist Party Speak."[5]

The article deeply shocked the party leadership on two counts: first, because it marked the first time in the crisis that a group of dissident members had violated discipline to the point of airing the dissensions within the party and their own grievances against the leadership in an organ of the bourgeois press; second, because its unidentified authors went much farther than the editors of *l'Etincelle* in outlining a coherent, though somewhat general, opposition program for democratizing the party and reducing its subservience to Moscow.

THE PROGRAM rejected, first of all, the dogmatization of Leninist theory in any form, as well as the imposition of any restrictions on the analysis of current problems, either for reasons of convenience or out of fear of "revisionism." In particular, it demanded thorough reappraisal of Communist theories concerning modern capitalism, failing which the party's struggle against the capitalist system is reduced to a Quixotic tilting at windmills. The authors further rejected the present socio-political order in the Soviet Union as a model and announced as their goal a socialist system combining collective ownership of the means of production with political democracy in such manner as to benefit all members of the community as individuals.

Despite the anonymous authorship of the article, the intimate knowledge of internal party affairs which its contents reflected points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that it did—as stated by the editors of *l'Express* in their prefatory note—emanate from a group of genuine party dissenters. The evidence suggests that the group was probably a different one from that represented by *l'Etincelle*, for the authors in *l'Express* were more concerned with long-term ideological factors and policies than the editors of *l'Etincelle*, whose tone was more personal and whose remedies were more immediately practicable. (Still a third opposition tendency was already known to have existed in the party ranks for some time, going under the appelation of "Unir." This tendency represented an important segment of disaffected party trade unionists; after the events of last fall in Eastern Europe, it had become particularly active in protesting the party leadership's policies "tending to discredit the Polish comrades.")

2 In the Ain election, the Communist vote on the final ballot showed a gain of about 2.5 percentage points over the 1956 general election. In the Lyons election, held to fill the vacancy created by the death of Radical Socialist elder statesman Edouard Herriot, the Communist vote on the final ballot was about 3 percentage points higher than in 1956.

3 Report of Marcel Servin to the Fourteenth Party Congress, published in *Cahiers du Communisme* (Special Issue), July-August 1956, p. 209.

4 This figure was reported in a detailed account of the Communist Party membership situation published in *France Soir*, March 3 and 4, 1957. *France Soir* claimed that its story was based on a report presented to the Politburo by Organizational Secretary Servin between March 1 and 3. As a general rule, reports to the Politburo are kept strictly confidential, but in this case the information appears to have leaked out after it was officially disseminated to party cells and sections *in order to spur them* to greater efforts in obtaining membership renewals.

5 "Les Clandestins du P.C. parlent," *l'Express*, February 15, 1957, pp. 14-15. The weekly also carried, on p. 13 of this issue, a facsimile reproduction of the first issue of *l'Etincelle*.

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It was a curious concidence that the new manifestation of inner-party rebellion in the pages of *l'Express* came just as the party Central Committee was in the second day of a two-day meeting (February 14-15) at Ivry, on the outskirts of Paris—a meeting which produced an interesting admixture of conciliatory moves belatedly reversing some decisions taken during the heyday of Stalinism and, on the other hand, some rather stiff and uncompromising reassertions of Stalinist principles of party discipline and full obedience to Moscow policy.

The most significant conciliatory gesture was the Central Committee's action finally formalizing the rehabiliation of former Politburo member Charles Tillon, who had been ignominiously expelled from all activity in the party in 1952 as a Titoist. As expounded at the time by his principal accuser before the Central Committee, Leon Mauvais, Tillon's Titoism was clearly evidenced by his attachment to "nationalistic concepts and his lack of understanding for the imperious necessity of examining the situation in France in the light of the international situation." [6]

Unlike other prominent party figures who were purged later and who, instead of submitting quietly, began actively fighting the party leadership, Tillon had remained in silent retirement after 1952.[7] His good behavior won him readmission to the Communist Veterans organization in 1955, and fresh services to the party leadership in the latter part of 1956 served to further pave the way for his complete rehabilitation. The Central Committee's action restoring him to full party rights was therefore not surprising, but the circumstances strongly suggested that the move was intended to ease the rising tensions within the party and possibly to counterbalance the leadership's simultaneous reaffirmation of the old "hard line" in other areas. On the conciliatory side, the Central Committee also took new action toward hastening the resumption of relations between the PCF and the League of Yugoslav Communists.

HAVING TENDERED the velvet glove of conciliation with its decisions regarding Tillon and the Yugoslav Communists, the Central Committee proceeded to thrust into it the familiar iron fist of expulsion and intimidation. First, the committee gave partial satisfaction to a resolution of the party cell in Issy-les-Moulineaux demanding the expulsion of the well-known Communist writer, Claude Roy, for violating party discipline during the Hungarian affair.[8] A strong threat of similar disciplinary action against the oppositionists who were attacking the party leadership in public print was also implicit in Mr. Thorez' violent condemnation of "foreign elements who have insinuated themselves into the ranks of the working class" and of "the few elements who are determined to pursue their handiwork of sapping and disintegrating" the party's strength.[9] In the critical area of the party's relationship with Moscow, opposition demands for greater independence were tacitly dismissed with reiterations of "the imperious necessity of preserving the unity of the Communist movement centered around the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." [10]

DESPITE THE CURIOUS combination of "hard" and "soft" tactics which the Central Committee adopted in February and which the party leadership has since continued to apply in its efforts to exorcize the fever of oppositionary unrest in the ranks, that fever has not ceased to plague the party and weaken its unity. The various opposition groups could hardly regard the mere rehabilitation of Tillon as indicative of any real change in party policy, and it certainly gave no satisfaction whatever to their demands for far-reaching measures of inner-party democratization. Accordingly, they have continued to press these demands, equally undeterred by the leadership's "hard-line" threats of punitive action. Opposition publications on the order of *l'Etincelle* are still appearing.

The effectiveness of the pressure which these groups can bring to bear upon the leadership has been reduced by the fact that they have thus far not organized themselves into a unified opposition with an agreed platform. Despite this "fractionalization," however, there does appear to be a wide measure of spontaneous agreement among them on the need for such democratic reforms as freer elections at all levels of the party organization, on the convocation of a special party congress to permit full and free discussion of all outstanding issues, and on the establishment of closer relations of friendship with the Polish and Yugoslav parties.

For its part, the leadership has as yet shown no inclination to budge from its substantive (as distinguished from tactical) Stalinist policies. It conspicuously failed to do this even during the high tide of Moscow-decreed destalinization, and its belief in the correctness of these policies was strengthened rather than weakened by the late 1956 events in Eastern Europe, to which it could point as proof of the menace inherent in liberalization. The fact that the recent trend in Moscow has been to backtrack part way along the road of destalinization and to restore some features of the "hard line" has tended to reinforce the position of the French party leadership and to bolster its resistance to the demands of the reformists.

Nevertheless, the continuing ferment of opposition in the party ranks confronts the leadership with a problem the seriousness of which it neither is disposed nor can afford to minimize. It has been obliged to recognize that "hard line" tactics are likely to exacerbate rather than stop the ferment, and it is endeavoring to weed out the oppositionists by more gradual and subtle methods wearing the disguise of measures for "democratizing" the organization of the party federations. Whether or not it will succeed in this endeavor, only time and events—both in France and elsewhere—can tell.

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6 Quoted in a recapitulation of the Tillon case published in *Paris-Presse-l'Intransigeant*, February 19, 1957.

7 Both Auguste Lecoeur, former Organizational Secretary of the party and Pierre Herve, former editor of *l'Humanite*, launched bitter attacks on the party leadership after their expulsions from the party in 1954 and 1956, respectively.

8 J.-F. Rolland, another prominent Communist intellectual, had already been expelled from the party in November 1956 on the same charge.

9 Thorez speech before the Central Committee, published in *l'Humanite*, February 18, 1957.

10 From report presented to the Central Committee by Raymond Guyot, dealing with PCF relations with other Communist parties, published in *l'Humanite*, February 16, 1957.

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NOTE ON THE NEW PURGE:

As this issue went to press, the news of the latest purge in the Kremlin was announced to the Russian public and the world at large. Not unnaturally, it is tempting immediately to compare the present developments with the Great Purge of the 1930's, when Stalin moved to consolidate his personal hold over the party and state by eliminating all his real and potential rivals for power, and by instituting a reign of terror that claimed thousands of lives and that struck fear into the hearts of the entire population of Russia. And not unnaturally, too, it is tempting to conclude that history indeed repeats itself, and that Stalinism—now in the person of the cunning and peripatetic Nikita Khrushchev—is staging a triumphant come-back.

But is it? Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the one factor that has played an increasingly important role in recent Soviet politics—namely, the people of Russia. In the 1930's, Stalin showed his utter contempt for his subjects by manufacturing charges against his opponents that defied all standards of reason and credibility. By staging macabre show trials, he created an atmosphere of ubiquitous fear that effectively prevented any doubts from emerging into the open. Individual terror was inadequate for his purposes; to achieve supreme power, he needed *mass terror*. His methods worked: personal dictatorship replaced the oligarchy, and the masses were stupefied into silence and submission.

The present struggle for power, on the other hand, takes place in an atmosphere vastly different from that of twenty years ago. The people who are asked to believe that Malenkov has opposed the increase of consumer goods, or that Kaganovitch's reputation for improving the Soviet transport system has now been found to have been "greatly exaggerated," or that Shepilov has been opposed to the policy of surpassing the United States in the production of meat and butter, are not the same people who twenty years ago were ordered to believe the even more bizarre and preposterous charges against Lenin's closest associates. They have heard Khrushchev denounce Stalin as a fiend and a murderer, they have been told many of his policies were wrong and disastrous, and that many erstwhile dogmas were mere lies. Under the impact of these shattering disclosures, and no longer subject to a reign of terror, they have, in the past few years, given evidence of independence of mind and opposition to the regime which would have probably driven Stalin into a frenzy of repression.

It is, indeed, this new spirit of the Russian people which has compelled the Kremlin to present its latest piece of jungle-politics not as a Stalinist-type "vigilance" campaign, but rather as an act designed to better the lot of the Soviet population—in fact, as the culmination of the entire "destalinization" drive. The people now find themselves, in a way, catered to rather than trampled upon, wooed rather than intimidated. The regime is, of course, shrilly proclaiming its "monolithic unity" and urging its subjects to "rally ever closer" around it. Yet these appeals may very well fall upon deaf ears. The more shrill and hysterical the present campaign becomes, the more "revelations" about the victims' former "crimes" are announced (why weren't they made public earlier?), the more discredited will the present leadership be. For the people of Soviet Russia surely recognize the current drama for what it is: a further manifestation of the decay of the totalitarian dictatorship.

—The Editors

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